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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Abu Ghraib—Civil
Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts by U.S.
Military Personnel and Civilian Contractors
I. INTRODUCTION
The Abu Ghraib prison in central Baghdad has been called “one of
the world’s most notorious prisons” because it is where Saddam
Hussein’s regime tortured and executed countless Iraqi civilians.1
Unfortunately, it has also become notorious because of the abuse Iraqi
prisoners received at the hands of U.S. military personnel and civilian
contractors.2 Pictures of stripped prisoners forced into humiliating
positions or threatened with dogs have become an all too familiar sight
on the news and Internet.3
Many of the soldiers and reservists involved in the abuses at Abu
Ghraib have been reprimanded,4 a number have pleaded guilty to various
crimes,5 and Specialist Charles A. Graner Jr., the alleged ringleader, was
recently convicted by a court martial and sentenced to ten years in prison
1. Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact.
2. See, e.g., id.; David Morgan, Abu Ghraib Probe Suggests CIA Role in Iraqi Deaths,
REUTERS, Apr. 4, 2005, at http://www.reuters.com; Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Military Says
26 Inmate Deaths May Be Homicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at A6; Neil A. Lewis & David
Johnston, New F.B.I. Files Describe Abuse of Iraq Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, at A5; CBS
News,
Abuse
of
Iraqi
POWs
by
GIs
Probed,
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml (Apr. 28, 2004); MG Antonio
M. Taguba, AR 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (May 27, 2004),
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/TR3.pdf [hereinafter Taguba Report]. Because various
versions of the Taguba Report use different pagination, and because the document itself has
inconsistent internal pagination, this Comment will refer to the page number of the PDF file from the
ACLU.
3. The released photographs are collected and displayed on many websites. One of the most
websites
posts
the
photographs
at
the
following
two
URLs:
thorough
http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/iraqis_tortured
(last
modified
May
21,
2004);
http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/iraqis_tortured/index2.htm (last modified May 21, 2004).
4. See, e.g., Don Van Natta, Jr., Interrogation Methods in Iraq Aren't All Found in Manual,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at A5.
5. See John W. Gonzalez, Prosecutions Wind Down at Fort Hood;
No One Ranked Higher than Staff Sergeant Faces Charges in the Abu Ghraib Case, HOUS. CHRON.,
Apr. 4, 2005, at B1 (collecting data on the all of the soldiers charged in connection with the abuse at
Abu Ghraib).
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for his participation in the abuse.6 All of this is certainly a necessary
response to what happened at Abu Ghraib. Still, because court martial
proceedings are essentially criminal in nature, they generally do not
provide a civil remedy for victims.7 Not only would providing a civil
remedy satisfy the victim’s interest in being compensated for a horrible
wrong committed against him,8 but because winning the hearts and
minds of the Iraqi people is essential to the success of the United States’
efforts in Iraq, providing a remedy for the victims of misconduct by U.S.
personnel should be important to the United States.9 And given evidence

6. E.g., id.; Kate Zernike, Jury Takes Five Hours To Reach Verdict in Abu Ghraib Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A1 (discussing court martial, guilty verdict, and sentence of Specialist
Graner); Susan Candiotti & Jim Polk, Graner Sentenced to 10 Years for Abuses, CNN, at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/01/15/graner.court.martial/index.html (Jan. 15, 2004) (discussing
same).
7. See ESTELA I. VELEZ-POLLACK, MILITARY COURTS-MARTIAL: AN OVERVIEW 3–5
(Cong. Research Service, Order Code RS21850, May 26, 2004) (describing the three types of courts
martial and the potential punishments under each). Court martial jurisdiction can be exercised over
“persons with or accompanying the military in the field during ‘times of war.’” Id. at 2 (citing
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL art. 2 (2002); 10 U.S.C. §
802 (2004)). Civil relief is never mentioned as a potential punishment under the various types of
court martial. See id. However, in their capacity as criminal courts, courts martial can either order
restitution or consider it as a mitigating factor in sentencing. See MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL pt.
IV, § XI, R. 97a, art. 134 (2002) (allowing a court to order restitution as a condition of parole); id.
pt. II, chap. XI, R. 1105 (allowing consideration of restitution in sentencing); 53A AM. JUR. 2D
Military and Civil Defense § 262 (2004).
8. “In accordance with Islamic principles to intentionally or negligently cause physical
injury to another, or to cause him financial loss engages liability in reparation as prescribed in
traditional authorities.” S.H. AMIN, The Legal System of Iraq, in MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS
188–90 (1985). According to Professor Amin, the Iraqi civil provision based on this maxim is “very
wide and comprehensive[;] . . . it omit[s] any reference to the concepts of intention, culpa or fault.
Accordingly, all personal injuries should be compensated for under Iraqi law whether they are
caused intentionally, negligently or otherwise.” Id. at 189 (citing CIVIL CODE art. 202 (1951) (Iraq)).
Therefore, even if it was not emphasized under Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraqis have a historical
and philosophical justification for expecting compensation from those who mistreat them.
9. See Brian Knowlton, Anger Grows over Iraqi Prisoners, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 4,
2004, http://www.iht.com/articles/518107.html (quoting Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi,
“If Americans are in Iraq to promote democracy, is this the way to do it?”); Press Release, Office of
the Press Secretary, President Bush Welcomes Canadian Prime Minister Martin to White House
(Apr.
30,
2004),
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2004/04/20040430-2.html (Responding to the question “How are you going to win
[the Iraqi people’s] hearts and minds with these sort of tactics?,” President Bush stated, “I shared a
deep disgust that those prisoners were treated the way they were treated. Their treatment does not
reflect the nature of the American people.”).
As this Comment was going to press, the ACLU and Human Rights First filed a suit on behalf
of several Iraqi and Afghani detainees against Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and various other
Defense Department officials for their supervisory role in the abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan. See
Press Release, ACLU, ACLU and Human Rights First Sue Defense Secretary Rumsfeld over U.S.
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of similar abuses by U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors10 at
other locations throughout Iraq, in Afghanistan, and at Guantanamo
Bay,11 the availability of civil relief for similar victims should be an
important part of the United States’ prosecution of the larger war on
terror.
On the other hand, providing civil relief against U.S. soldiers or
civilian contractors accompanying the military is also problematic. After
all, the United States really is at war, and some damage and disruption
are inevitable. This Comment will argue that the United States should
provide relief for the victims of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, and will
discuss the potential avenues that should be available to the victims and
the limitations on those theories. Specifically, it will discuss the Foreign
Claims Act (FCA), a quasi-administrative remedy created by Congress to
provide compensation for damage arising from the noncombat operations

Torture
Policies
(Mar.
1,
2005),
at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/
SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17584&c=206; see infra note 11. The Complaint alleges violations of various
domestic statutes, internal military regulations, the ATS, and the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
Complaint,
Ali
v.
Rumsfeld,
available
at
http://www.aclu.org/
Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=17573 (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). The Complaint is helpful because it
details many of the injuries suffered by individual plaintiffs.
10. Candiotti & Polk, supra note 6 (reporting that Specialist Graner testified that “his orders
came from civilian contractors as well as military intelligence”).
11. See Neil A. Lewis, ACLU Presents Accusations of Serious Abuse of Iraqi Civilians, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at A10 (discussing some 4,000 pages of documents released by the Army that
describe abuse at Adhamiya Palace in Baghdad by U.S. Special Forces, “as opposed to prison guards
or interrogators” like those implicated in the Abu Ghraib scandal); Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston,
New F.B.I. Files Describe Abuse of Iraq Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, at A5 (discussing
documents describing participation by FBI agents in the abuse at Abu Ghraib and documents relating
to conduct at Guantanamo Bay that could also potentially amount to torture); Neil A. Lewis &
Douglas Jehl, New Documents Show Prison Abuse in Afghanistan and Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2005, at A11; Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks (June 17, 2004), at
http://www.newsobserver.com/front/story/
1343133p-7466153c.html (last modified June 20, 2004) (discussing criminal indictments filed
against civilian contractors for conduct in Afghanistan); Press Release, ACLU, Detainee Coerced
into Dropping Charges of Abuse Before Release (Feb. 18, 2005), at http:
//www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17515&c=206 (describing statement by Iraqi
detainee who was threatened with indefinite detention if he did not waive his right to seek an
investigation after being severely beaten by plainclothes military personnel, describing mock
executions in Afghanistan, and documenting the intentional destruction of photographs to “avoid
‘another public outcry’”); BBC News, US Accused of Afghan Jail Deaths, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4092073.stm (last modified Dec. 13, 2004). British soldiers
have also been convicted by court martial for abusing Iraqi civilian contractors. BBC News, Two
Soldiers
Guilty
of
Iraq
Abuse,
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
4290435.stm (last modified Feb. 23, 2005). This Comment will only discuss the availability of relief
to the victims at Abu Ghraib, but its analysis should apply to these other situations as well.
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of the United States military operating in foreign countries.12 Because
there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that the FCA is often inadequate,
and because the soldiers and contractors are immune under Iraqi law,13 it
will also discuss remedies potentially available under U.S. law, including
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Bivens
doctrine.
Any discussion of civil remedies under U.S. law for extraterritorial
torts by U.S. government employees or their agents is significantly
informed by the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, a case arising out of the kidnapping of a Mexican
doctor by bounty hunters employed by the Drug Enforcement Agency,14
and brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Alien Tort
Statute (ATS).15 Not only did this decision specifically limit the
availability of the FTCA and ATS to remedy extraterritorial tortious
conduct, but in intriguing dicta, Justice Souter suggested that the ATS
should not “supplant[] the actions under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents16 . . . that now provide damages
remedies for . . . violations” of the federal constitution.17 Of the statutory
theories presented in Sosa and the constitutional theories hinted at in
Justice Souter’s opinion, the FTCA will not provide relief against the
United States in its sovereign capacity, but the ATS and Bivens doctrine
should provide a remedy against the individual soldiers and contractors
who participated in the abuse.
Part II will discuss remedies available under U.S. law, including the
Foreign Claims Act, tort suits against the government, constitutional tort
suits against government agents, and the Alien Tort Statute, which
provides a remedy for extraterritorial torts and is only available to aliens.
Part III will introduce the Sosa decision and will discuss its ramifications
on the remedies discussed in Part II for extraterritorial conduct by U.S.
agents. Because Sosa does not rule out the option of constitutional tort
suits against U.S. officers, Part IV will discuss United States v. Verdugo12. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2004).
13. The victims will need to use United States law because the Coalition Provisional
Authority immunized U.S. soldiers and contractors to prosecution under Iraqi law. See Coalition
Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised) § 2, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf.
The
inadequacy of relief under the FCA is discussed infra at notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
14. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
17. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768.
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Urquidez, which held that aliens in foreign countries are not protected by
the Fourth Amendment, and thus cast doubt on the availability of a
Bivens remedy against U.S. agents who conduct arguably unlawful
searches abroad.18 It will then argue that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause is sufficiently different from the Fourth Amendment
to justify a different result under the deterrent rationale of the Bivens
doctrine. Part V returns to Abu Ghraib and considers how the theories
discussed in Parts II and IV could be applied to suits by the Abu Ghraib
victims against the various potential defendants.
II. CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER U.S. LAW—FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC RELIEF
The Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority has immunized American
soldiers and civilian contractors accompanying the military from
prosecution under Iraqi civil or criminal law.19 However, the Order
providing immunity under Iraqi law also provides that coalition
personnel are still subject to the jurisdiction of their “Sending State.”20
Therefore, any remedies against U.S. personnel for the abuses at Abu
Ghraib must come under U.S. law. In addition to analyzing the Foreign
Claims Act, which provides claims commissions in Iraq (and other
foreign countries), this Part will analyze the Federal Tort Claims Act,
which allows suit against the United States; constitutional tort theories,
which seek to hold a government employee or agent individually liable
for unconstitutional conduct; and the Alien Tort Statute, which is only
available to aliens.
A. The Foreign Claims Act—Compensating Claims in a
Foreign Country
The Foreign Claims Act, which creates claims commissions in
foreign countries where the military conducts substantial operations, is
perhaps the most direct remedy for the victims of misconduct by U.S.
soldiers. “The Foreign Claims Act provides for the settlement, and

18. 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990).
19. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2. While this
immunity technically expired on June 30, 2004, most of the abuses at Abu Ghraib took place before
that date. See Taguba Report, supra note 2; Department of the Army, Certification of Taguba Report
(June
4,
2004),
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/
released/TR1.pdf.
20. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17, supra note 13, § 2(3).
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payment up to $100,000, of a claim against the United States,” brought
by a resident of a foreign country, “where the damage, loss, personal
injury, or death occurs outside the United States . . . and is caused by, or
is otherwise incident to [the] noncombat activities of” the United States
military.21 It was enacted “[t]o promote and to maintain friendly
relations through the prompt settlement of meritorious claims.”22 The
term “noncombat activity” is therefore defined broadly and includes any
“activity, other than combat, war or armed conflict, that is particularly
military in character and has little parallel in the civilian community.”23
To further the goal of promoting friendly relations, procedures under
the FCA are designed to be flexible.24 The Secretary of each department
(Navy, Army, Air Force) “appoint[s] claims commissions, composed of
commissioned officers, . . . to settle and pay claims ‘under such
regulations as the secretary concerned may prescribe.’”25 There is no
need for the foreign citizen to come to the United States and sue—claims
commissions are usually established where the military has a significant
presence, and claims officers have full authority to settle claims up to the
full $100,000 allowed by statute.26
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that many Iraqis injured
through the negligent or even criminal conduct of U.S. soldiers are not
compensated for their injuries.27 Victims face a maze of procedures and

21. FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 73:193 (update June 2004) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2004)).
22. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a). The FCA does include a two year limitations period. See § 2734(b).
23. 32 C.F.R. § 842.41(c) (2004).
24. David P. Stephenson, An Introduction to the Payment of Claims Under the Foreign and
the International Agreement Claims Act, 37 A.F. L. REV. 191, 198–99 (1994).
25. Id. at 193 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (1990)). For example, “[i]n the Air Force, those
regulations appear in chapter 8 of the Air Force Regulation 112-1.” Id.
26. Associated Press, Report: Army Denies Most Compensation Claims by Iraqis (Oct. 24,
2004) (“Army Lt. Col. Charlotte Herring said the Army, which handles civil claims for all three
service branches in Iraq, has given out $8.2 million by June 2003 and budgeted $10 million in fiscal
year 2005 to help Iraqis deal with losses suffered because of war.”), at
http://www.civicworldwide.org/compensation/compensation-army-102404.htm; department of Defense,
Defend America—Iraq Update (Aug. 22, 2004), at http://www.defendamerica.mil/
iraq/update/aug2003/iu082203.html.
27. See, e.g., Occupation Watch Center in Baghdad & National Association for the Defense
of Human Rights in Iraq, Joint Report on Civilian Casualties and Claims Related to U.S. Military
Operations, at http://www.civicworldwide.org/pdfs/compensationreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 22,
2005); Occupation Watch Center & National Association of the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq,
Report on Civilian Deaths and Human Rights Violations by US Army and Uselessness of Claims
Process (Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Report on Civilian Deaths] (“Lawyers for NADHRI have filed
120 cases for compensation with the military, none of which have received compensation.
Occupation Watch has filed 20 and logged more than 80, none of which have received
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policies that keep many of them from ever presenting their claims for
consideration.28 According to one Iraqi translator and claims processing
assistant, “[o]nly [thirty] to [forty] percent get compensation.”29 While
this low rate of compensation may reflect legitimate decisions by claims
officers, it may also reflect budget constraints, military policy, an
unwillingness to consider meritorious claims, or other nonmerit based
considerations.30
The FCA includes a provision that “no claim may be paid under this
section unless the amount tendered is accepted by the claimant in full
satisfaction.”31 By implication, Congress realized that FCA claimants
could potentially seek relief through other avenues, including suit.32 So,
if Iraqis with meritorious but uncompensated claims could sue, what
remedies would be available to them? Furthermore, what remedies would
be available against the civilian contractors alleged to have participated
in the abuse?33 After all, while the FCA potentially provides relief for
damages caused by U.S. military personnel (limited by the combat
activities and the full satisfaction provisions), it does not make the
federal government an indemnitor for civilian contractors.34 The next
Subpart will discuss the sorts of remedies usually available in U.S. courts
for plaintiffs suing the government or its agents.

compensation.”),
at
http://www.occupationwatch.org/
article.php?id=2579 (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
28. Report on Civilian Deaths, supra note 27.
29. Orly Halpern, Running the U.S. Military’s Compensation Gauntlet, NEW STANDARD
(July 14, 2004), at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/consequences/
2004/0714gauntlet.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). The military is also able to provide “sympathy
payouts,” which are not treated as admissions of fault and can be paid for conduct technically falling
within the combat activities category. Id. The “maximum sympathy payout for wrongful death is
$2500, according to lists kept by the Iraqi Assistance Center.” Id. It is unclear whether this $2500 is
capped by some policy, or whether U.S. claims processors consider this amount, which could
provide food for a family of six for two years, as adequate compensation for wrongful death. See id.
30. See Report: Army Denies Most Compensation Claims by Iraqis, supra note 26
(discussing budgeted funds available to pay FCA claims).
31. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(e) (2004).
32. In other words, there would be no need to impose a full satisfaction requirement if injured
aliens could not assert their claims in a tribunal other than FCA claims commissions.
33. Candiotti & Polk, supra note 6 (quoting Specialist Graner’s testimony that civilian
contractors ordered some of the abuse).
34. The FCA does cover “civilian employee[s] of the military department concerned,” but
this does not extend to nonemployee civilians. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a).
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B. Relief in U.S. Courts
There are a number of theories under which plaintiffs injured by
government agents or activities can obtain redress in U.S. courts. The
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides a remedy directly against the
federal government for most claims of negligence by government
employees. The FTCA does not provide a remedy for claimants asserting
a violation of constitutional rights by federal agents, often referred to as
constitutional torts. However, statutory and judicially created remedies
allow suit against individual government agents for constitutional torts.
This Subpart will therefore discuss the FTCA and the Bivens doctrine,
both of which specifically relate to suits against the federal government
and its officers.
1. The Federal Tort Claims Act
In 1946 Congress enacted the FTCA as a broad waiver of the federal
government’s sovereign immunity and made the United States liable “in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.”35 It provides a comprehensive remedy against the
United States for tort claims resulting from the negligent or wrongful
acts or omissions of federal employees acting within the scope of their
employment or office.36
However, Congress imposed a number of limitations on that
waiver.37 For example, even though the United States is generally liable
“to the same extent as a private individual,” it cannot be held liable for
punitive damages or prejudgment interest.38 The FTCA also bars a suit
against the government unless the claim is first presented to, and denied
by, the appropriate federal agency.39 Even when a case goes to trial, a
jury is not available.40
In addition to these general limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 lists a
number of specific cases excluded from this waiver of sovereign
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2004).
36. It also conferred exclusive jurisdiction for such actions on the federal district courts. See
35A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 1 (2004).
37. Id. (citing Stubbs v. United States, 620 F.2d 775, 779 (10th Cir. 1980) (“Congress may
impose conditions upon a waiver of the Government’s immunity from suit. Moreover such
limitations and conditions must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.”
(internal citations omitted))).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
39. Id. § 2675.
40. Id. § 2402.
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immunity. When one of these exclusions applies, the district court is
without jurisdiction to hear the case.41 The most important exclusions
include the discretionary function exclusion, which applies when injury
results from a policy decision by an official charged with discretion;42
the Postal Service exclusion for the Postal Service’s negligence in
delivering the mails;43 and the exclusion for “[a]ny claim arising in a
foreign country.”44 The FTCA also excludes most intentional torts, such
as battery, assault, defamation, or malicious prosecution.45 However, this
section was amended in 1974 to allow liability for intentional torts
committed by “investigative or law enforcement officers of the United
States Government” to be asserted against the government.46
Another important limitation on the FTCA is that the United States
cannot be held liable for constitutional torts committed by its
employees.47 This limitation is largely based on the fact that while the
FTCA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity, the underlying cause of

41. E.g., 35A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 33 (2004).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (providing that the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not
apply to “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused”) (emphasis added)). The “discretionary function” exception has
proven ambiguous. See generally, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 621–24 n.30 (4th
ed. 2003).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b).
44. Id. § 2680(k); see infra Part III.B.2.a.
45. The FTCA excludes assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
46. Id.
47. In the Westfall Act, Congress effectively provided absolute immunity for federal
employees in negligence suits by requiring that the United States be substituted as the party
defendant upon certification by the Attorney General, or his designee, that the employee was acting
within the scope of his employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2004). Once the United States is
substituted as the party defendant, the case is converted into an FTCA action and must comply with
the administrative exhaustion and other requirements of FTCA suits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1).
However, the Westfall Act specifically provides that this protection “does not extend . . . to a civil
action against an employee of the [federal] Government . . . brought for a violation of the
Constitution of the United States.” § 2679(b)(2). Courts have consistently held that the Westfall Act
does not “supplant” Bivens, and many see it as implicitly ratifying it. See Apampa v. Layng, 157
F.3d 1103, 1104 (7th Cir. 1998); Haas v. Schalow, No. 98-1777, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 32654, at
*5–6 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 1998) (“Although the United States may be substituted for a federal
employee accused of committing a tort within the scope of his employment under the Westfall Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b), the Act does not apply to an action against an employee which is brought for a
violation of the Constitution.”).
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action typically must be based on state law,48 and violations of the
federal constitution are uniquely federal in character.49 In other words,
while the vast majority of suits for alleged government misconduct are
brought under the FTCA, suits for constitutional violations must be
brought against the officer individually.
2. Constitutional torts
The term “constitutional tort” refers to suits brought against
government agents for violating the Constitution, and these suits are
based, in part, on the theory that someone acting in the name of the
government, even unconstitutionally, “possesses a far greater capacity
for harm than an individual . . . exercising no authority other than his
own.”50 Because this Comment seeks to explore potential theories of
recovery for victims of torts committed outside the territory of the United
States, it is important to first understand the operation of these theories
within the United States.
Because the Fourteenth Amendment has incorporated most of the
Bill of Rights against the states and their officials, both federal and state
officials are obligated to respect federal constitutional commands.51 But
while the substantive restraints on both state and federal government
actors are largely the same, the methods of enforcing rights against those
actors are quite different. Constitutional tort suits against state actors are
typically brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a broad
remedy for constitutional violations.52 However, § 1983 does not apply
to federal officers.53 The Supreme Court, though, in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, created a
similar remedy against federal agents.54 Because states generally do not

48. 28 U.S.C. § 2674; see also United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
49. See, e.g., 35A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 5, at n.5 (2004).
50. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971).
51. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2011 (2004) (“[T]he incorporation
doctrine . . . holds that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates and applies against the States the
Bill of Rights . . . .”).
52. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
53. Russell v. United States Dept. of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1999).
54. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). There is some congressional and scholarly support for creating a
statutory right of action against federal officers or agents. See, e.g., Michael B. Hedrick, Note, New
Life for a Good Idea: Revitalizing Efforts To Replace the Bivens Action with a Statutory Waiver of
the Sovereign Immunity of the United States for Constitutional Tort Suits, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1055 (2003). Mr. Hedrick’s article collects and analyzes a number of valuable sources. I disagree
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act internationally, and because most international operations are
conducted under federal law—including under the so-called dormant
foreign relations power reserved to the Executive Branch55—this Subpart
will focus on the Bivens doctrine. It will, however, first briefly discuss 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for contrastive purposes.
a. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is perhaps the most important of
the civil rights statutes.56 It provides the following:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .57

In short, § 1983 provides a remedy against state officers for
violations of federal law.58 In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court
extended § 1983 liability to those actions that would have also been
unlawful under state law, holding that the fact that state law also makes
the conduct illegal “is no barrier to . . . suit in the federal court.”59 By
holding that § 1983 is available even where there is a remedy under state
with his conclusion that the United States, rather than the individual officers, should be liable for
constitutional torts. Id. at 1065–67. As discussed infra regarding Malesko, one of the purposes of the
Bivens remedy is the deterrent effect of personal liability. Infra Part II.B.1. Substituting the United
States for such violations would likely resolve a number of problems with immunity, see infra notes
98–103 and accompanying text, but making individual officers—the targets of the Bivens remedy—
immune to suits for their own intentional deprivations of constitutional rights, seems shortsighted. It
is better to deter violations than merely designate who shall pay. There is also the apparent
Congressional ratification (or at least acquiescence) of Bivens in the Westfall Act. See supra note 47.
55. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266–67 (1985) (Section 1983 is the “most important, and
ubiquitous, civil rights statute.”).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004) (emphasis added).
58. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), for the proposition that there can be § 1983
liability for violations of the Social Security Act. By so holding, the Court extended § 1983 liability
to even federal laws not enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment. Now § 1983 is available for
nearly all federal laws that provide enforceable individual rights of action, see Gonzaga Univ. v.
Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989),
unless Congress has intended to provide an alternative remedy, see Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
59. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). While various parts of Monroe have been called into question
in later decisions, its holding that state officers can be sued under § 1983 for any federal
constitutional violation is still good law. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42 at 475–78.
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law, the Supreme Court made § 1983 an attractive option where state law
may impose procedural obstacles, such as a notice or exhaustion
requirement, to suits against government agents.
In certain circumstances, § 1983 also provides a remedy against
private persons who act under color of state law.60 A private individual
can be liable under § 1983 if “he is a willful participant in joint activity
with the State or its agents”61 or if he exercises a function typically
reserved to the states, such as providing private police or security
services.62 For example, in Johnson v. Larabida Children’s Hospital, the
Seventh Circuit held that a
private party will be deemed to have acted under “color of state law”
when the state either (1) “effectively directs or controls the actions of
the private party such that the state can be held responsible for the
private party’s decision”; or (2) “delegates a public function to a private
entity.”63

Section 1983 is important in civil rights litigation both because it is
broad and because it is statutory. As discussed below, because it is judgemade, not only is Bivens subject to frequent criticism, it is also subject to
frequent judicial tinkering not applied to § 1983.64
b. Bivens. Section 1983 does not address violations of federal law by
federal officers or others acting under color of federal law.65 In part to
cure the inequity of providing relief for victims of constitutional
violations by state but not federal officers, the Supreme Court, in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, created a
cause of action against federal agents in their individual capacity for such
violations.66
60. See Johnson v. Larabida Children’s Hosp., 372 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2004) (“While
generally employed against government officers, the language of § 1983 authorizes its use against
private individuals who exercise government power; that is, those individuals who act ‘under color
of state law.’”).
61. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
62. Id.
63. 372 F.3d at 896 (quoting Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d
623, 628 (7th Cir. 1999)).
64. See infra notes 76–97 and accompanying text.
65. Russell v. United States Dept. of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1999); see also
Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1343 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Federal officers acting under federal
authority are immune from suit under section 1983.”).
66. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Quoting Marbury v. Madison for the proposition that “[t]he very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
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In Bivens, federal drug officers conducted an unconstitutional search
and seizure.67 Despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment does not
specifically provide an individual right of action to persons subjected to
unauthorized searches,68 the Court has concluded that “a violation of the
[Fourth] Amendment is ‘fully accomplished’ at the time of an
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”69 Because “the Fourth
Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power,”
and because subsequent remedies such as exclusion of evidence would
not put the injured party in the position he would have been in but for the
intrusion, the remedy for that constitutional violation “is damages or
nothing.”70 Furthermore, while exclusion of evidence may annoy federal
law enforcement officers, the Court concluded that neither exclusion nor
state tort actions for trespass would provide a sufficient deterrent to
prevent violations of the Fourth Amendment.71 Therefore, the Court held
that someone injured by unconstitutional conduct by a federal agent
could assert a claim for damages directly under the Fourth Amendment.72
In addition to Fourth Amendment violations, the Supreme Court has
recognized a Bivens remedy for violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.73 The Court has also “accepted the general existence
of [Bivens] causes of action for violations of the First Amendment,”74
and lower federal courts have allowed Bivens suits for violations of the
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.75

the laws, whenever he receives an injury,” the Court further concluded that providing no remedy at
all was unacceptable. Id. at 397 (quoting 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)).
67. Id. at 397. Not only were the search and arrest conducted without a warrant, the agents
allegedly used unnecessary force. Id. at 389.
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also infra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
69. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)).
70. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392; id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 394–95; see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001).
72. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395–97. The Bivens Court also justified a damages remedy on the
traditional availability of damages for violations of privacy interests. Id.
73. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67 (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979)).
74. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 593 n.30 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983));
see also Rebecca L. Brogan, Research, Prisoners’ Rights, 33 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 873,
879–85 (2004) (collecting sources).
75. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 593 nn.31–36 (collecting sources). Lower court
decisions have been more explicit in accepting Bivens suits for First Amendment and for other types
of constitutional torts. See generally id. at 587–610 for a thorough overview of the Bivens doctrine.
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Because the Bivens remedy is implied by the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has “responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens
remedies be extended into new contexts”76 and has routinely limited the
scope of the remedy. For example, in FDIC v. Meyer, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that Bivens relief is unavailable against a federal
agency, even if the employees of that agency could potentially have been
liable.77 Furthermore, Bivens relief is unavailable if “Congress has
provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declare[s] to be a
substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and [which is]
viewed as equally effective.”78 Finally, the creation of a cause of action
under Bivens is inappropriate where there are “special factors counseling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”79
The Bivens remedy is also problematic because the Supreme Court
has justified it on two different theories. As will become clearer after
discussing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,80 the Supreme Court has
justified this creation of a constitutional/common-law cause of action on
the theory that to do so is necessary to vindicate the deprivation of a
constitutional right,81 and to deter government officers from acting
unconstitutionally.82 In most cases, these different rationales overlap, but
in the discussion of Abu Ghraib, the deterrence rationale applies but the
vindication rationale does not. The Supreme Court’s most recent major
decision on Bivens, Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko,83 is
important for this Comment’s analysis of remedies for the Abu Ghraib
victims because it forcefully articulates the deterrence rationale.84

76. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988).
77. 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994).
78. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980).
79. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. There are some courts that have seen the Westfall Act as
Congressional ratification of the Bivens doctrine. See supra note 47.
80. 494 U.S. 259 (1990); see infra Part IV.
81. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] traditional judicial
remedy such as damages is appropriate to the vindication of the personal interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis added)); id. at 407–08 (“[A]ccording . . . compensatory relief does
not turn simply on the deterrent effect liability will have on federal official conduct.”); see also, e.g.,
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 243–44 (1979).
82. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of
whether the States in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the
identical act if engaged in by a private citizen.”).
83. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
84. Id. at 72.
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(1) Malesko: Bivens, private actors, and the deterrence rationale.
The Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Correctional Services
Corporation v. Malesko limited the availability of a Bivens remedy in
cases against private actors (government contractors) brought under a
respondeat superior theory.85 In Malesko, a federal inmate was enrolled
in a halfway house operated by Correctional Services Corporation
(CSC), a private corporation under contract with the Federal Bureau of
Prisons.86 During his imprisonment, the inmate was diagnosed with a
heart condition and was permitted to use the elevator to reach his fifthfloor room, despite a policy that required inmates “residing below the
sixth floor to use the staircase rather than the elevator to travel from the
first-floor lobby to their rooms.”87 Despite his exemption, a CSC
employee required the inmate to take the stairs.88 While doing so, he
suffered a heart attack, fell, and was injured.89
The inmate sued both the employee who had required him to use the
stairs and CSC under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Relying on
the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in FDIC v. Meyer,90 which held
that Bivens relief is unavailable against federal agencies, the district court
dismissed his complaint against CSC.91 Additionally, it dismissed the
complaint against the employee as barred by the statute of limitations.92
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that
Bivens does not support respondeat superior liability.93 “‘[T]he purpose
of Bivens is to deter the officer,’” not his employer.94 The Court reasoned
that “if a corporate defendant [such as CSC] is available for suit,
claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual
directly responsible for the alleged injury.”95 By characterizing the
purpose of Bivens as a deterrence, the Court easily concluded that the
threat of suit against either the government or a private employer is

85. Id. at 70–71.
86. Id. at 63–64.
87. Id. at 64.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
91. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 65.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 71.
94. Id. at 69 (quoting Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485).
95. Id. at 71 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 (1993)
(plurality)).
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“insufficient to deter the unconstitutional acts of individuals,”96 and that
“[w]ith respect to the alleged constitutional deprivation, [the plaintiff’s]
only remedy lies against the individual.”97
(2) Qualified immunity. Recognizing that Bivens is a potentially
broad doctrine against individuals accused of violating the Constitution
does not mean that federal officers are automatically liable for
constitutional torts. Rather, they enjoy the broad protection of the
qualified immunity doctrine.98 In Hope v. Pelzer, the Supreme Court
held that a government employee accused of violating the Constitution
“may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil damages if [his]
actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”99 Because the
“clearly established test is met [only] if ‘in the light of pre-existing law
the unlawfulness [is] apparent,’” honest mistakes by government
employees are protected.100 In fact, qualified immunity has been held to
protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.”101

96. Id. at 68.
97. Id. at 72. The Supreme Court did note that CSC could potentially be subject to respondeat
superior liability under regular tort theories. Id. at 72–73. Justice Scalia, concurring in Malesko, said
he does not believe Bivens should be extended to any new contexts. “Bivens is a relic of the heady
days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action—decreeing them
to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition.” Id. at 75 (Scalia,
J., concurring). Justice Stevens, writing for himself and three other justices, strongly disagreed. He
argued that “[t]he violation was committed by a federal agent[,] a private corporation employed by
the Bureau of Prisons[,]” and he criticized the majority for allowing state tort law to act as a
replacement for federal constitutional protections infringed by that agent. Id. at 76–80 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also CHEMERINKSY, supra note 42, at 610 n.122. Chemerinsky compiles several preMalesko cases that came to conflicting results as to whether a Bivens remedy was appropriate against
private actors. See id.
98. Government employees, but not civilians acting under government authority, enjoy
qualified immunity. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 539–40 (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158, 168–69 (1992)). In negligence suits, the Westfall Act effectively provides absolute immunity
for federal agents because the United States is substituted as the party defendant. 28 U.S.C. §
2679(b)(1) (2004); supra note 47.
99. 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
100. Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).
101. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). But see Hope, 536 U.S. at 730. Hope is an
important decision because it is one of the few recent Supreme Court cases to strike down a qualified
immunity defense. See id. at 746–47. The plaintiff in Hope brought suit under § 1983 after prison
guards placed him in leg irons, removed his shirt, and handcuffed him to a hitching post for seven
hours in the summer sun with little water and no bathroom breaks. Id. at 734–35. Justice Stevens
held that even though the use of a hitching post had not been ruled unconstitutional, the conduct was
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Moreover, “[q]ualified immunity is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial
or face the other burdens of litigation.’ The privilege is ‘an immunity
from suit rather than a mere defense to liability’” and should be raised
early in the proceedings.102 Therefore, qualified immunity is a powerful
shield available to federal government defendants (but not civilian
contractors)103 who are sued under Bivens.
3. Relief only available to aliens—the Alien Tort Statute
While it may seem odd that there would be a statute allowing suits
by aliens but not by citizens, this is precisely what the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) does.104 The ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”105 Judge Friendly described the ATS as a “legal Lohengrin; . . .
no one seems to know whence it came.”106 After the Second Circuit’s
decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, holding that the ATS permitted
citizens of Paraguay to sue another citizen of Paraguay for torture that
occurred there,107 the ATS has been used by a number of courts as
grounds for hearing a broad range of cases alleging human rights
violations.108 The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain

so egregious that the defendants had “fair warning” from similar cases that their conduct was
inappropriate. Id. at 741.
102. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
526 (1985)).
103. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 539–40 (citing Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168–69).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004). This statute is also referred to by many courts and
commentators as the Alien Tort Claims Act or ATCA. See, e.g., Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d
205, 208 (2d Cir. 2004). Because the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain refers to the statute
as the Alien Tort Statute, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2746 (2004), this Comment will do the same.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
106. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). Lohengrin was a knight in
Germanic Grail legends who appeared in a swan-drawn boat to save a damsel in distress. See, e.g.,
Britannica
Concise
Encyclopedia,
at
http://www.britannica.com/ebc/
Lohengrin,
article?tocId=9370476 (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
107. 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. See, e.g., Herero People’s Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, 370 F.3d 1192 (D.C. Cir.
2004); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). Filartiga has been described as a watershed
case. See, e.g., David P. Kunstle, Note, Kadic v. Karadzic: Do Private Individuals Have Enforceable
Rights and Obligations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 319, 320
(1996). Justice Scalia in Sosa criticized the Second Circuit as “start[ing] the Judiciary down the
path” to conflict with the Executive and Legislative Branches. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2775 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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carefully considered the ATS and its proper scope, and it will be
discussed in detail in Part III, infra.
The ATS also includes the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA),109 which was enacted in 1992 to amend the ATS in the wake of
Filartiga and is largely seen as ratifying Filartiga’s result.110 In Sosa,
the Supreme Court described the enactment of the TVPA as a specific
extension of judicial application of the ATS to provide relief for torture
committed abroad.111 The TVPA creates a private right of action for any
individual or his estate subjected to either an extrajudicial killing or
torture committed “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign nation.”112
While the ATS is not available to U.S. citizens, it nevertheless offers
intriguing options to the victims of abuse at Abu Ghraib that may not be
available under the more traditional FTCA suits against the federal
government itself or constitutional tort suits (§ 1983 and Bivens) against
government agents. Because the contours of a cause of action under the
ATS will now depend on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that
statute in Sosa, the next Part will detail both the factual and procedural
history of the Sosa decision and its analysis of the ATS.
III. SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN—THE MOST RECENT SUPREME COURT
DECISION ON DOMESTIC LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT
As mentioned above, because American soldiers and contractors
have been immunized against prosecution under Iraqi law,113 if the Abu
Ghraib victims should choose to assert liability against their abusers,
they must do so under U.S. law. The Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain will play an important role in evaluating what
theories of recovery should be available to them because Sosa involved a
suit by an alien for conduct occurring in a foreign country. In Sosa, a
Mexican doctor, who had been forcibly abducted from his office in

109. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2004)).
110. See, e.g., James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 Note, 199 A.L.R. FED. 389 (2004).
111. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a) (emphasis added). Because the TVPA, unlike the ATS,
provides a cause of action for any individual, it provides a cause of action for U.S. citizens subjected
to torture. The TVPA also includes an exhaustion requirement in favor of local tribunals and a tenyear statute of limitations. Id. § 2(b)–(c).
113. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2; see also
supra notes 13 & 19–20 and accompanying text.
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Guadalajara and prosecuted for his alleged role in the torture-murder of a
DEA agent, sued civilly after the criminal case against him was
dismissed.114 Because the Supreme Court’s ruling on the doctor’s
various theories will control future suits on those theories, this Part will
discuss the Sosa decision and the Supreme Court’s holdings on the
FTCA and ATS. It will also discuss the possibility of Bivens suits, which
the doctor pleaded but did not press on appeal, and which the Supreme
Court intimated would be available.
A. The Factual and Procedural History of Alvarez-Machain’s Criminal
Prosecution
The decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain was nearly twenty years in
the making. In February 1985, Enrique Camarena-Salazar, a Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) officer, “was kidnapped outside the
American consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico.”115 Approximately one
month later, his “mutilated body was found about sixty miles outside of
Guadalajara along with the body of his Mexican pilot.”116 A tape
recording made by his kidnappers indicated that Agent Camarena was
interrogated, tortured, and then murdered.117
Based on that recording, eye-witness testimony, and other evidence,
the DEA concluded that Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain had kept Agent
Camarena alive during the interrogation and participated in his torture.118
After the DEA’s negotiations with Mexican government officials to have
Alvarez-Machain extradited to the United States were unsuccessful, the
DEA hired a number of Mexican bounty hunters, including Jose
Francisco Sosa, to abduct Alvarez-Machain and bring him to the United

114. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746–47.
115. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601–02 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
116. Id. at 602.
117. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746; United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 768–69
(9th Cir. 1995). Camarena’s brutal torture and murder prompted “Operation Leyenda,” the largest
homicide investigation ever undertaken by the DEA. See DEA History Book 1985–1990, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/deamuseum/dea_history_book/1985_1990.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2005). It is also still at the center of a number of conspiracy theories. See, e.g., Who’s a Rat Message
Board,
http://www.websitetoolbox.com/tool/post/whosarat/
vpost?trail=30&id=12 (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
118. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice
Oversight (May 16, 2000) (statement of William E. Ledwith, Chief, Office of International
Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration) (testifying that the tapes implicating the various
defendants were seized by the Mexican military and turned over to the DEA),
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/ct051600_01.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
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States.119 Pursuant to a plan apparently approved by the DEA,120 on
April 2, 1990, five or six Mexican agents abducted Alvarez-Machain
from his obstetrics office in Guadalajara at gunpoint.121 AlvarezMachain testified that he was taken to a house where he was subjected to
various abuses and, after waiting for several hours, was flown to El Paso,
Texas.122 In El Paso, DEA agents took custody of Alvarez-Machain and
transported him to Los Angeles.123
Over the strenuous objections of the Mexican government, which
considered the abduction a violation of the U.S./Mexico extradition
treaty,124 Alvarez-Machain was brought before the District Court for the
Central District of California. The district court agreed with Mexico and
ordered Alvarez-Machain’s return to Mexico.125 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, citing its then-recent decision in United States v. VerdugoUrquidez that the forcible abduction of Mexican citizens violated the
U.S./Mexico Extradition Treaty and that the United States was required
by the treaty to repatriate the suspects.126
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded,127 holding that “to infer
from this [Extradition] Treaty and its terms that it prohibits all means of
gaining the presence of an individual outside of its terms goes beyond
established precedent and practice.”128 In broad language, the Court held
that “the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the
fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of
a ‘forcible abduction.’”129 On remand, the district court granted AlvarezMachain’s motion for acquittal.130

119. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 602–03. Not only did the DEA pay for the abduction, it
brought a number of the abductors and their families to the United States. Id. at 603–04.
120. Id. at 603.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2001). The federal
grand jury that indicted Alvarez-Machain sat in Los Angeles. Id. at 1049.
124. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 604.
125. Id. at 614.
126. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991)). Verdugo-Urquidez involved another
one of the alleged participants in the Camarena murder. 939 F.2d at 1343.
127. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). It is somewhat odd that the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Alvarez-Machain rather than Verdugo-Urquidez because the
Ninth Circuit’s Alvarez-Machain decision was based almost entirely on Verdugo-Urquidez.
128. Id. at 668–69.
129. Id. at 661 (quoting Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952)). Justice Stevens, joined
by Justices Blackmun and O’Connor, vigorously dissented. He concluded that the extradition treaty
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B. Alvarez-Machain’s Civil Suit

1. The district and circuit courts
After the criminal proceedings against Alvarez-Machain were
terminated, he returned to Mexico and initiated a civil suit against the
United States under the FTCA for a number of alleged torts,131 against
the DEA officers under Bivens for violations of the Fourth
Amendment,132 and against the Mexican bounty hunters under Bivens
and the ATS for abducting him in violation of the law of nations.133 The
district court granted summary judgment for the DEA agents and bounty
hunters on the Bivens claims, finding that because a federal grand jury
had indicted Alvarez-Machain and because a federal judge had issued a
warrant for his arrest, any seizure was reasonable and therefore not

provided the sole method for obtaining jurisdiction over a citizen of a contracting nation. Id. at 673–
74 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1351).
130. The Ninth Circuit concluded on remand that no norms of customary international law
prohibited federal court jurisdiction and remanded to the district court for trial. See United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 971 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1992). The district court granted Alvarez-Machain’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746. The acquittal was apparently based, at
least in part, on the government’s failure to arraign Alvarez-Machain before a magistrate promptly
after entry to the United States and failure to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence. See
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the evidence was
apparently strong enough for Judge Goodwin to conclude that Alvarez-Machain “was present at the
house where Camarena was held.” Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1035, 1048 (9th Cir.
2001).
There is also some suggestion that the district court excluded evidence implicating AlvarezMachain, despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Verdugo-Urquidez that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect noncitizens outside of the United States. 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990); see also infra
notes 193–95 and accompanying text.
131. Alvarez-Machain, 107 F.3d at 699.
132. Id. Alvarez-Machain originally asserted a Bivens claim under the Fourth, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendments but did not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments did not apply to the facts of the case. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, No. CV
93-4072 SVW (SHx), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23304, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1999). While it is
not entirely clear why the court made its Eighth Amendment finding, it was likely based on the
testimony of a Dr. Meza (also referred to as Mesa), who examined Alvarez-Machain on his entry
into the United States and concluded that there was “no sign of mistreatment or abuse” and that, at
the time, Alvarez-Machain did not complain of any mistreatment by his kidnappers. Caro-Quintero,
745 F. Supp. at 604. Therefore, the only Bivens claim remaining by the time of summary judgment
(and subsequently presented to the Ninth Circuit) was for the alleged Fourth Amendment violation.
133. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747. Alvarez-Machain asserted claims under both the ATS and
TVPA, but for reasons not entirely clear, he did not pursue the TVPA claims. See Alvarez-Machain
v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 610 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
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violative of the Fourth Amendment.134 It granted summary judgment to
the United States on a number of the FTCA claims,135 but finding that
the law enforcement exception applied, it refused to grant summary
judgment on the counts alleging intentional torts by federal officers.136
The court granted summary judgment in favor of Alvarez-Machain
against the Mexican citizens on those claims brought under the ATS137
and even awarded $25,000 on the abduction claim.138
On appeal, both a panel and the en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed the
availability of the ATS as a remedy against Sosa and the other individual
defendants on the abduction and arbitrary detention claims.139
Specifically, the en banc majority held that the ATS “not only provides
federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction, but also creates a cause of
action for an alleged violation” of a “‘specific, universal, and
obligatory’” norm of international law.140 Based on various international
documents, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the norms against abduction
and arbitrary detention were sufficiently specific, universal, and
obligatory to support liability under the ATS.141
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the law enforcement exception ruling and
reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States on
the other FTCA claims.142 It concluded that the foreign country
exception—which provides that the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign
immunity does not apply to “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign
country”143—did not bar Alvarez-Machain’s suit because of the

134. Alvarez-Machain, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23304, at *19–20.
135. Including those claims for kidnapping, cruel and degrading treatment, and negligent
hiring. Id. at *27–*28, *30–*34.
136. Id. at *39–*40. As discussed supra at note 46 and accompanying text, the intentional tort
exception allows the assertion of liability against the United States for conduct taken by law
enforcement officers. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2004).
137. Alvarez-Machain, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23304, at *65, *76.
138. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747. The district court also expressed its willingness to grant
summary judgment for Alvarez-Machain on the arbitrary detention claim. See Alvarez-Machain,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23304, at *64, *72.
139. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001) (panel); AlvarezMachain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
140. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 612 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig.,
25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
141. Id. at 621 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702, cmt. h;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. art. 9(1) (Dec. 16, 1966) (ratified
June 8, 1992) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”)).
142. Id. at 639–40.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2004).
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“headquarters doctrine.”144 The headquarters doctrine allowed a foreign
plaintiff to assert FTCA liability against the United States for conduct or
injuries occurring in a foreign country if government officers acting
within the United States directed the conduct that led to that injury.145 It
was based on the premise that the act of arranging or directing tortious
conduct should create liability regardless of where the harm was
realized.146 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions on the ATS and FTCA, but
particularly to address its holding on the headquarters doctrine.147
2. The Supreme Court
a. The FTCA. All nine U.S. Supreme Court justices agreed to reverse
the Ninth Circuit on the FTCA foreign country exception. Justice
Souter’s opinion for the Court specifically rejected the headquarters
doctrine: “We . . . hold that the FTCA’s foreign country exception bars
all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of
where the tortious act or omission occurred.”148 Because the FTCA
incorporates the substantive law of the state where the act or omission
occurs, and because of the prevalence of the lex loci delicti rule at the
time the FTCA was enacted,149 the Court concluded that the foreign
country exception150 was designed to avoid the application of foreign
law against the United States in its sovereign capacity based solely on
where an injury was felt.151

144. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 638–39.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746.
148. Id. at 2754.
149. Id. at 2750–51. The Court explained lex loci delicti by reference to the RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1934), which determines liability based on “the law of the
place of wrong.” Thus, Justice Souter concluded, “[f]or a plaintiff injured in a foreign country . . .
the presumptive choice in American courts under the traditional rule would have been to apply
foreign law to determine the tortfeasor’s liability.” Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
151. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751. “The amended version, which was enacted into law and
constitutes the current text of the foreign country exception . . . codified Congress’s ‘unwilling[ness]
to subject the United States to liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power.’” Id. at 2752
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949)). Justice Ginsburg,
writing for herself and Justice Breyer, would have applied a “last significant act or omission” rule
rather than lex loci delicti, which would have made Mexico, not California, the source of relevant
tort law. Id. at 2781–82 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In either event, by holding that the law of the
place of injury applies, this choice of law analysis effectively precludes the Abu Ghraib detainees
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b. The ATS. The Supreme Court limited the availability of a cause of
action under the ATS more narrowly than the Ninth Circuit had. The
Court unanimously held that while the ATS is technically only
jurisdictional, “at the time of enactment, the jurisdiction enabled federal
courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of
nations and recognized at common law.”152 It further found that this
limited category contained at least three torts mentioned by Blackstone:
“violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors,
and piracy.”153
The Court split, though, over whether additional, more-recent
principles of international law could be incorporated into the “law of
nations” actionable under the ATS. A six justice majority concluded that
“no development in the two centuries from the enactment of [the ATS] to
the birth of the modern line of cases . . . has categorically precluded
federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an
element of common law.”154 While the majority was hesitant to extend
federal common law,155 especially in situations involving international
law (which is primarily the province of the executive),156 it did not rule
out new causes of action under the ATS. As grounds for continuing to
recognize the possibility of new causes of action under the ATS, the
majority relied on the fact that “[f]or two centuries we have affirmed that
the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”157

from asserting common law tort theories against their abusers, who are immune to Iraqi law. See
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2. For this reason, this
Comment will not discuss common law tort theories against the abusers.
152. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754.
153. Id. at 2756 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68). Blackstone also
included the slave trade among those torts that violated international law. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *68.
154. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761. Those concurring with Justice Souter’s opinion were Justices
Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 2764.
155. Id. at 2762. The Court specifically cited Malesko for the proposition that the “decision to
create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of
cases.” Id. at 2762–63; see also supra Part II.B.2.b.
156. Id. at 2763.
157. Id. at 2764 (citing Sabbatino v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630,
641
(1981)
(holding
that
“‘international
disputes
implicating
. . . our relations with foreign nations’ are one of the ‘narrow areas’ in which ‘federal common law’
continues to exist”)). Therefore, the majority was unwilling to conclude that the ATS is limited to
just Blackstone’s three torts.
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As to the question of how courts are to determine when a violation of
international law can be remedied under the ATS, the majority generally
accepted the “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm of international
law rule employed by the Ninth Circuit.158 Although the majority held
that an action must be clearly defined as violating customary
international law to justify allowing a cause of action under the ATS, it
also held that other factors should be considered.159 Among the other
factors mentioned were treaties, statements by the political branches,
“the customs and usages of civilized nations,” and the work of
scholars.160
Under this standard, the majority found that any prohibition on
arbitrary detentions was not sufficiently clearly defined so as to create a
right to sue under the ATS.161 Justice Souter further posited that finding
arbitrary detention actionable under the ATS would
support a cause of action in federal court for any arrest, anywhere in the
world, unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took
place, and would create a cause of action for any seizure of an alien in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, supplanting the actions under . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents . . .
that now provide damages remedies for such violations.162

This is important dicta.163 While it forcefully closes the door to
recovery by Alvarez-Machain against Sosa and the other defendants
under the ATS,164 by referring to Bivens in the same paragraph as a

158. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 612 (2003) (quoting In re Estate of
Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
159. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766–67.
160. Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
161. Id. at 2769 (“[A] single illegal detention of less than a day . . . violates no norm of
customary international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy.”).
162. Id. at 2768–69 (emphasis added).
163. It is dicta because Alvarez-Machain had abandoned the Bivens claim by the time his case
reached the Supreme Court. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 610 n.2 (“The constitutional claims under
Bivens . . . are no longer at issue.”).
164. The Court unanimously agreed that Alvarez-Machain could not recover under the ATS.
See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746 (“We hold that [Alvarez-Machain] is not entitled to a remedy under
either the FTCA or the ATS.”). Justice Souter and the majority concluded that violations of the law
of nations other than arbitrary detention could possibly support liability under the ATS, id. at 2764,
and Justice Scalia would not allow any new liability under the ATS, id. at 2776 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). While it is still unclear whether Alvarez-Machain actually participated in Agent
Camarena’s death, see supra note 130, if he is guilty, he has at least been barred from recovering
civil damages. Cf. Beck v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 241 P.2d 544, 545 (Cal. 1952) (“[I]t would be
unconscionable to allow [someone] to profit from his own wrong.”). But if he is actually innocent, as
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discussion of extraterritorial searches, it juxtaposes extraterritorial
conduct and constitutional liability and suggests that Bivens may be
applicable to violations of the Fourth Amendment outside the United
States.165 Because the ATS is available only to aliens, it would be
illogical to suggest that § 1983 and Bivens could be supplanted by a
cause of action under the ATS if aliens could not use § 1983 or Bivens to
seek a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment. And by
suggesting that allowing a cause of action under the ATS for arbitrary
detention committed outside the United States would supplant Bivens,
the majority indicates that Bivens can be extended to extraterritorial
conduct. In other words, if aliens could not sue for extraterritorial
constitutional violations, there would have been no need to suggest that
the ATS could supplant § 1983 and Bivens, and the majority’s statement
that § 1983 and Bivens “now provide damages remedies for such
violations”166 would make no sense. Thus, the clear implication of this
statement is that aliens injured by extraterritorial unconstitutional
conduct can, in certain situations, seek a remedy on a constitutional tort
theory.
Justice Breyer, who had joined Justice Souter’s opinion,167
concurred specially to state that he would permit courts to consider
violations of international law under the ATS only if they fell within the
limited set of torts that every nation would subject to universal criminal
jurisdiction.168 As examples of this narrow subset, Justice Breyer listed
“torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.”169
Because arbitrary detention is not criminally punishable in a majority of
countries, Justice Breyer concluded that Alvarez-Machain’s ATS claim
should fail.170
suggested by the dismissal of the indictment, then the Supreme Court’s decisions holding that it is
not only permissible to abduct someone in violation of a valid extradition treaty, United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 661 (1992) (discussing the criminal case against Alvarez-Machain),
but that the victim of such an abduction cannot sue his abductors, Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769, are
disturbing. To repeat Justice Stevens’ dissent in Alvarez-Machain’s criminal case, “most courts
throughout the civilized world—will be deeply disturbed by the ‘monstrous’ decision the Court
announces today. For every nation that has an interest in preserving the Rule of Law is affected,
directly or indirectly, by a decision of this character.” Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 687–88
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990); infra Part IV.
166. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768.
167. See id. at 2745 (indicating Justice Breyer in the majority).
168. Id. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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The remaining three justices (Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas) agreed
the ATS provided a cause of action for Blackstone’s three torts at the
time of its enactment.171 However, Justice Scalia argued that courts
should not be able to consider any other torts under the ATS, on the
conclusion that whatever power federal courts had had to craft common
law causes of action at the time the ATS was enacted had “been
repudiated by Erie” and its progeny.172
3. Suits for extraterritorial torts after Sosa
Because Sosa directly ruled on a suit by an alien asserting liability
against the United States under the FTCA and its agents under the ATS,
it is controlling precedent for any suit that the Abu Ghraib detainees may
bring under either theory. The Court’s holding in Sosa that the foreign

171. Id. at 2775 (Scalia, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 2773. Justice Scalia’s concurrence compares the ATS with Bivens, both of which
involve judicially created causes of action. While he has criticized Bivens as being “a relic of the
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action[,] decreeing
them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition,” Corr. Servs.
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring), because Bivens seeks “to enforce a
command of our own law[,] the United States Constitution,” Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2772 (Scalia, J.,
concurring), he is willing to recognize Bivens’s continued validity in a narrow subset of cases,
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring). He is not willing to do the same for the ATS. See
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2774 (Scalia, J., concurring).
The majority disagreed with Justice Scalia’s Erie conclusion.
[The ATS] was enacted on the congressional understanding that courts would exercise
jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of nations;
and we know of no reason to think that federal-question jurisdiction was extended subject
to any comparable congressional assumption. Further, our holding today is consistent
with the division of responsibilities between federal and state courts after Erie, as a more
expansive common law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 [federal question jurisdiction]
might not be.
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765 n.19.
On the one hand, the majority’s decision simply ratifies the view that there was nothing
magical about Blackstone’s torts, other than international consensus condemning them. See id. at
2755–56; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71 (“[P]iracy
. . . is an offense against the universal law of society . . . .”). Accordingly, the majority’s conclusion
that clearly defined violations of the law of nations should be actionable under the ATS is
unremarkable. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766. On the other hand, Justice Scalia is right that Erie was “an
avulsive change, wrought by ‘conceptual development in understanding common law . . . [and
accompanied by an] equally significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts in making it.’” Id.
at 2773 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting the majority, id. at 2762). Because I am primarily concerned
with the practical question of what causes of action would be available should the Abu Ghraib
victims choose to sue their abusers in U.S. courts, I am more interested in Justice Souter’s majority
opinion. A full analysis of the Erie and federal common law questions raised by Justice Scalia is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
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country exception categorically bars suits against the United States for
injuries received in a foreign country will preclude the Abu Ghraib
detainees from asserting liability against the United States in its
sovereign capacity. However, the majority’s holding—that a violation of
a sufficiently clearly defined norm of customary international law will
allow the creation of a cause of action under the ATS—should be
extended to torture, based on both domestic and international agreement
that torture violates customary international law.173 And combined with
Justice Breyer’s narrower position that modern international law
allowing universal criminal jurisdiction over “torture, genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes”174 would permit a cause of action
under the ATS for such conduct, there is a good argument that what
happened at Abu Ghraib—if determined to be torture—should be
covered by the ATS.175
The potential availability of Bivens after Sosa is a harder question.
As discussed above, the statement in Justice Souter’s majority opinion
juxtaposing extraterritorial conduct and constitutional liability implies
that Bivens is available for certain violations of the Constitution
wherever they occur.176 But this conclusion needs to be analyzed in light
of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, another Supreme Court case
discussing (and limiting) the extraterritorial application of the United
States Constitution.177
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ AND THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
Because any suits by the Abu Ghraib detainees would need to plead
U.S. law,178 and because constitutional tort theories are one of the
principal methods for holding government agents responsible for

173. See infra Part V.B.1.
174. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2783 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 404 & cmt. a (1986)).
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004); see infra notes 253, 258–59. I suspect that some of the
conduct at Abu Ghraib would satisfy the legal definition of torture, while other conduct, though
reprehensible, would not. See Complaint, Ali v. Rumsfeld, supra note 9.
176. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768 (concluding that § 1983 and Bivens “now provide damages
remedies” for extraterritorial seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
177. 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
178. Otherwise, both the soldiers and civilian contractors would be shielded by the immunity
provided by Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2.
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violations of the Constitution,179 whether a constitutional tort would lie
for conduct occurring outside of the United States is an important
consideration in evaluating the full range of options that would be
available to the Abu Ghraib detainees.
This consideration raises a number of questions, including whether it
is appropriate to apply domestic law, and particularly constitutional law,
extraterritorially. There is a general presumption against the
extraterritorial application of domestic law, but that presumption is
subject to a number of qualifications.180 For purposes of analyzing any
potential liability arising from the abuse at Abu Ghraib, the most
important of these qualifications is the principle that the Constitution can
bind the conduct of U.S. officers wherever they act. However, this
principle is also subject to qualification and dispute.
Therefore, Subpart A will discuss United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, which held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect aliens
from searches conducted in foreign countries.181 Subpart B will discuss
the differences between the Fourth and Eighth Amendments and will
argue that these differences support the proposition that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause limits the conduct of U.S. officers wherever
they act. Therefore, violations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause should support a cause of action under Bivens wherever they are
committed.
A. The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law—Verdugo-Urquidez and
the Constitution
“It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”182 In United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Supreme Court held that “[n]either the
Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in
foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens.”183 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Verdugo-Urquidez is an important starting point in
the constitutional analysis of potential remedies under U.S. law for the

179. See supra Part II.B.2.
180. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
181. 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
182. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc., 336 U.S. at 285).
183. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
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Abu Ghraib victims because it considers the relationship between the
commands of the Constitution and the conduct of federal officers
extraterritorially.
In Verdugo-Urquidez the Supreme Court considered whether “the
Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by United States
agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a
foreign country.”184 The factual scenario is fairly straightforward: DEA
agents believed that Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican citizen,
was a drug smuggler and had participated in Agent Camarena’s
murder.185 Mexican police arrested Verdugo-Urquidez and transported
him to California, where he was turned over to the U.S. Marshals.186
DEA agents arranged a search of Verdugo-Urquidez’s property in
Mexico, obtained permission from the Director General of the Mexican
Federal Judicial Police, and then conducted the searches.187
The district court suppressed the evidence seized in the searches.188
The court held that because the searches and seizures had not been
authorized by a warrant, they were unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.189 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court
reversed,190 holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect
nonresident aliens from unreasonable searches or seizures in foreign
countries, and that there was therefore no need to rely on the
reasonableness analysis employed by the district court.191
The Supreme Court based its conclusion on the text of the Fourth
Amendment, which protects “[t]he right of the people.”192 “‘[T]he
people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . refers to a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part
of that community.”193 Because Verdugo-Urquidez was not a resident of

184. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261.
185. Id. at 262; see also supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
186. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 263.
189. Id.
190. Id. One Ninth Circuit judge dissented, concluding that the Curtiss-Wright decision barred
extraterritorial application of the Constitution. Id. at 264 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)).
191. Id. at 274–75 (Stevens, J., concurring).
192. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
193. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
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the United States, the Court concluded that he was not included within
“the people” protected by the Fourth Amendment.194
The Court distinguished cases addressing or protecting the
constitutional rights of aliens by concluding that those cases “establish
only that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections with the country.”195 Based on this principle, the VerdugoUrquidez majority concluded that applying the Fourth Amendment
extraterritorially would allow “aliens with no attachment to this country .
. . [to] bring [Bivens] actions for damages to remedy claimed violations
of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries.”196 Even though it
recognized that Bivens relief can be limited when there are “special
factors counseling hesitation,”197 the possibility of suits by aliens “with
no attachment to this country” seemed particularly troubling to the
Court.198
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, argued that “the Government
may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in
question are foreign or domestic.”199 He agreed that the Fourth
194. Id. at 274–75.
195. Id. at 271; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“It is well established
that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to
aliens outside of our geographic borders.”); Khalid v. Bush, Civil Case No. 1:04-1142 (RJL), Civil
Case No. 1:04-1166 (RJL), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749, at *24 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005) (“In the final
analysis, the lynchpin for extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry to aliens was and
remains ‘the alien’s presence within [the United States’] territorial jurisdiction.’” (citing Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950))). Zadvydas, Khalid and Eisentrager all involved requests to
recognize a right to habeas corpus for aliens held by the United States. They could be distinguished
on this ground from the discussion of Abu Ghraib, in which the victims would be seeking civil
damages as opposed to habeas relief.
196. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274. While this statement may pose problems for victims
of abuses by United States officials, the Abu Ghraib detainees could argue that they have at least a
nominal “attachment to this country” because they are detained by American military police. See
infra note 286 and accompanying text.
197. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 16, 18 (1980).
198. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274. Notably, the Court did not preclude the application
of Bivens to cases brought by aliens. See id. In fact, it specifically left the question open. See id. At
the very least, the Abu Ghraib detainees have some attachment to this country in that they were held
under U.S. authority and abused by U.S. citizens exercising authority over them pursuant to U.S.
policy.
199. Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (plurality
opinion)). Contra id. at 268–69 (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court) (“[N]ot every constitutional
provision applies to governmental activity even where the United States has sovereign power . . .
[or] wherever the United States Government exercises its power.” (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258
U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904))).
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Amendment had not been violated because a number of factors—
including “[t]he absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue
warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of
reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate
with foreign officials”—justified the failure to apply the strict protections
of the Fourth Amendment.200 He even agreed that the Court could
properly distinguish between citizens and aliens.201 But he was unwilling
to consider the proposition that officials acting under the authority of the
Constitution can act unconstitutionally.
Given the history of our Nation’s concern over warrantless and
unreasonable searches, . . . [t]he restrictions that the United States must
observe . . . depend . . . on general principles of interpretation, not on
an inquiry as to who formed the Constitution or a construction that
some rights are mentioned as being those of “the people.”202

Thus, one of the principal differences between the majority and the
concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez is their view of whether the
Constitution protects only citizens (and those aliens that have become
part of the national community), or whether it limits the power of
government to act. Under the majority’s approach, the Constitution
protects citizens, and even arguably unconstitutional conduct by
government actors does not give rise to a constitutional remedy if a
citizen’s rights are not violated.203 Under Justice Kennedy’s approach,
the Constitution regulates the conduct of government actors wherever
they operate.204 This debate also informs an analysis of the Eighth
Amendment—the constitutional provision most likely to support a
Bivens remedy for the Abu Ghraib detainees—because the Eighth
Amendment is subject to both constructions.
B. Two Views of the Eighth Amendment
There are important differences between the Eighth Amendment and
the other provisions of the Bill of Rights. Unlike the First, Second, and

200. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 275–76.
202. Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
203. In Verdugo-Urquidez the constitutional remedy was the exclusion of evidence in a
criminal prosecution. Id. at 264. Any discussion of Bivens was therefore dicta.
204. Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Under this approach, Bivens relief ought to be
available against U.S. officers for unconstitutional actions taken abroad.
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Fourth Amendments, which protect “the people,”205 and unlike the First
Amendment, which is addressed to Congress,206 the Eighth Amendment
simply prohibits specified activities.207 The entire text of the Eighth
Amendment provides, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”208
The first two prohibitions, the Excessive Bail and Excessive Fines
Clauses, impose limitations on judicial processes similar to those
imposed by the Fifth209 and Sixth210 Amendments. The Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, though, not only applies to the judicial
process as a limitation on sentencing,211 but it also imposes limitations
on how the government can treat prisoners.212
If the Eighth Amendment regulates the treatment of prisoners within
the United States (and it does213), it should similarly regulate the
treatment of prisoners held under U.S. authority outside of the United
States.214 In other words, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
205. U.S. CONST. amends. I, II & IV. Thus, the Eighth Amendment, unlike other provisions of
the Bill of Rights, does not have the hook on which the Supreme Court hung its Verdugo-Urquidez
analysis. Moreover, the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez never addressed the Eighth Amendment. See
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259.
206. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”).
207. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
208. Id.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. V (setting out the Grand Jury Indictment Clause, the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the federal Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause).
210. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (setting out the Speedy Trial Clause, the Confrontation Clause,
and the Right to Counsel Clause).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 537 (6th Cir. 2004).
212. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S.
461, 488 (1993) (“[T]he better view is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended
to place . . . substantive limitations on punishments” rather than procedural limits on the imposition
of sentences.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258–64 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(discussing the debate on the Eighth Amendment and concluding that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause was intended as a limitation on government—particularly legislative—authority
to control the treatment of prisoners); Brogan, supra note 74, at 888–900; David Heffernan,
Comment, America the Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment Under
International Law, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 481, 487–518 (1996) (discussing the evolution of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence).
213. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002), discussed supra note 101.
214. Obviously this argument is based on a view that the Eighth Amendment both protects a
U.S. citizen’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and substantively limits the
government’s conduct in the treatment of prisoners. One Law Review editor suggested that the
Constitution, and the Bill of Rights in particular, is concerned with protecting the rights of “We the
People,” not of aliens with no connection to the United States. While I realize that this view finds
support in the majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, I submit that providing no constitutional
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should limit the conduct of U.S. agents whenever the United States acts
in a penal or custodial capacity. Or, to return to the language of Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez, because the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause does more than just protect an individual’s
rights, “the Government [should be able to] act only as the Constitution
authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic.”215
Because the Constitution would provide these limits on government
actors, this approach would not violate the Curtiss-Wright maxim that
“[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have
any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens.”216 In
other words, because the conduct of U.S. government actors is controlled
by the Constitution, and because federal agents are either citizens or
otherwise bound by the Constitution, extending a constitutional
limitation on conduct by government agents to wherever they act would
still be “in respect of our own citizens.”217
This argument returns us to the question of whether the purpose of
Bivens is to vindicate the violation of a right or to deter the violation of a
constitutional command. If the purpose of the Constitution is to protect

protection against cruel or unusual punishment to noncitizens held under U.S. authority is not
supported by history or practice. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)
(holding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable for lack of criminal punishment but not for lack of
citizenship), id. at 739 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (observing that “there is no limitation as to the
beneficiaries” protected by the Third, Seventh, or Eighth Amendments); A. Mark Weisburd, Due
Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379 (1997);
Kristi J. Spiering, Comment, Irrebuttable Exile Under the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments: A Perspective from the Eighth Amendment and International Human Rights Law, 58
U. CIN. L. REV. 1397, 1409 nn.78–79 (1990). Professor Weisburd’s analysis is particularly relevant.
He analyzed Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), which basically held that the Fifth
Amendment did not protect aliens held by U.S. forces abroad. See supra note 195. According to
Professor Weisburd, because the Court
felt it necessary to address . . . the distinction between a claim that a particular individual
is entitled to the Fifth Amendment's protection and a claim that an individual has been
harmed by an action which the federal government had no authority to take[,] . . . the
Johnson court made clear that even persons not entitled to the protections of the Fifth
Amendment were entitled to demand that the United States government refrain from
actions which harmed them and which the government was not competent to take.
Weisburd, supra, at 391.
215. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Eric B. Fisher,
Note, The Road Not Taken: The Extraterritorial Application of the Fourth Amendment
Reconsidered, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 705 (1996).
216. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
217. Id. Conduct limitations based on citizenship are quite common. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
2340A (2004) (providing that a U.S. national can be criminally prosecuted for torture in the United
States regardless of where the conduct occurs).
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the rights of citizens,218 and if aliens “with no attachment to this
country”219 have no constitutional rights, then Bivens should not provide
them a remedy even when U.S. officers act in a way that would violate
the rights of a citizen.220 But if the Constitution limits and controls the
conduct of government actors, and if the purpose of Bivens is to deter
constitutionally unauthorized conduct,221 then Bivens should provide a
remedy for anyone injured by unconstitutional conduct, regardless of
where it occurs. As discussed above, Supreme Court precedent supports
both views of Bivens.222
A fuller analysis of whether the Constitution protects the rights of
“We the People,” whether it limits the government, or whether it protects
rights by limiting the government is beyond the scope of this
Comment.223 For present purposes it must suffice to argue that the
potential for these different views of the Constitution prevents any of
them from being dismissed out of hand. And if constitutionally
unauthorized conduct by a government actor injures someone under that
actor’s control, basic principles of equality224 militate in favor of
providing a similar remedy under the law, regardless of the citizenship of
the person injured.
V. PROVIDING A REMEDY TO THE VICTIMS OF
ABUSE AT ABU GHRAIB
Whether violations of the Constitution create a Bivens cause of
action regardless of the citizenship of the victim is, of course, only one of
the questions presented in addressing potential civil liability arising out
of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. This Part will discuss the
various U.S. laws under which the victims could potentially sue,

218. As implied in the majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
219. Id. at 274.
220. See id. at 273.
221. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392 (1971); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69–70 (2001) (quoting FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994)).
222. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 (discussing how Bivens deters unconstitutional conduct);
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274 (explaining that Bivens protects citizens); supra Part II.B.2.b.
223. For a thorough analysis of the varying ways questions involving the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution have been addressed, see Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?,
100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991); see also Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word “Due,” 38 AKRON L. REV. 1
(2005); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International
Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT’L. L. 444 (1990).
224. But probably not the Equal Protection Clause.
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including the FCA, FTCA, ATS, and Bivens, and will apply each of them
to the potential defendants and to the particular circumstances of the war
in Iraq.
The abuses at Abu Ghraib were first disclosed when Sergeant Joseph
Darby passed a disc with the now infamous photographs of detainee
abuse to his commanding officer.225 The military began an internal
investigation, the results of which are detailed in the report compiled by
Major General Antonio Taguba. The Taguba Report concludes that there
is “incontrovertible evidence that . . . abuse did occur.”226 Among the
instances of “intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel”
reported by Taguba were instances of physical violence, forced sexual
degradation and assault, and intimidation by military dogs.227 Taguba
characterized the conduct as criminal and concluded that both military
personnel and civilian contractors were guilty of engaging in the
abuse.228 There were also reports of at least two deaths from the
abuse.229
As discussed in the Introduction, many of the soldiers accused of
participating in the abuse have pleaded guilty to various crimes, and
Specialist Graner has been convicted and sentenced by a court martial.230
However, because courts martial maintain the distinction between
criminal and civil proceedings,231 American court martial proceedings
against the soldiers will likely not provide a civil remedy to the victims
of abuse.232 And what of the civilian contractors who worked with the
225. See Richard A. Serrano & Greg Miller, Army Investigators Heard Accounts from Inmates
of Abu Ghraib and Intelligence Officers, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at A1; supra note 3.
226. Taguba Report, supra note 2, at 2–6.
227. Id. at 16–17.
228. Taguba Report, supra note 2, at 2. The ACLU sued for the release of documents related
to the abuse scandal under the Freedom of Information Act. See Press Release, ACLU, Government
Documents on Torture Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 21, 2005), at
http://www.aclu.org/International/International.cfm?ID=13962&c=36. All of the documents released
that
suit
are
available
in
PDF
form
from
http://
pursuant
to
www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released (last visited Nov. 13, 2004). There is also a good review of the
Abu Ghraib situation at Wikipedia, Abu Ghraib Torture and Prisoner Abuse, at http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghraib_torture_and_prisoner_abuse (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
229. See Hersh, supra note 1. Unfortunately, there is mounting evidence that more deaths are
also attributable to misconduct by government actors. See Morgan, supra note 2; Jehl & Schmitt,
supra note 2.
230. See supra notes 4–6.
231. 53A AM. JUR. 2D Military and Civil Defense § 366 (2004).
232. Except perhaps for restitution. See supra note 7. There would likely be a different result
in other countries, which generally provide civil relief in a consolidated proceeding with the criminal
prosecution. As Justice Breyer points out in his concurrence in Sosa, while there is international
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soldiers?233 While they could probably be prosecuted criminally in the
United States under either the War Crimes Act of 1996234 or the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA),235 neither of these options
would provide a civil remedy to the victims.
The remainder of this section will discuss the potential methods of
obtaining civil relief against each of the potential defendants. It
concludes that the FCA is probably the most attractive option for the Abu
Ghraib victims because the FCA provides recovery from the fiscally
responsible United States without involving the foreign country
exception to the FTCA. If the victims choose not to pursue remedies
under the FCA, or if they choose to hold their abusers directly

consensus regarding “torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,” “[t]hat consensus
concerns criminal jurisdiction,” not civil jurisdiction. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739,
2783 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). Even if “the criminal courts of many nations combine civil and
criminal proceedings, allowing those injured by criminal conduct to be represented, and to recover
damages, in the criminal proceeding itself,” the American system does not. Id. For example, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) could likely have asserted both criminal and civil authority over
the U.S. soldiers, and perhaps even the contractors, who participated in the abuse. See Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). Article 7 of
the Rome Statute grants jurisdiction over those accused of “crimes against humanity,” including
torture, rape, and other sexual abuse. Additionally, article 8 grants jurisdiction over war crimes,
including torture. Article 77 allows for the imposition of prison sentences, and a fine or forfeiture.
Although the United States had signed the treaty on December 31, 2000, it withdrew from the
ICC on May 6, 2002. See Press Statement, International Criminal Court: Letter to U.N. Secretary
General
Kofi
Annan
(May
6,
2002),
at
http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm. Therefore, the ICC is not really an issue. Nevertheless, even if the United
States had not withdrawn from the treaty, if the soldiers involved in the abuse were subject to court
martial proceedings, they could not then be prosecuted at the ICC. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 at art. 20(3) (providing that the ICC does
not have jurisdiction to hear cases that have already been tried under domestic law).
233. See Candiotti & Polk, supra note 6 (reporting that Specialist Graner testified that “his
orders came from civilian contractors as well as military intelligence”); Joanne Mariner, Private
Contractors Who Torture, FINDLAW’S WRIT (May 10, 2004), at http://writ.find
law.com/mariner/20040510.html; Taguba Report, supra note 2, at 2.
234. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2004). The War Crimes Act allows prosecution of, and punishment
for, “grave breaches of the Geneva Convention,” which prohibits torture, inhuman treatment,
“outrages upon personal dignity,” and “humiliating and degrading treatment.” Geneva Convention,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516. There have been indictments filed against civilian contractors
for violations of the War Crimes Act in Afghanistan. See Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra
note 11. Even though there have not yet been indictments for civilian participation in the abuses at
Abu Ghraib, if Afghanistan is an indicator, there may be, and this would be a welcome development.
Section 2340A of 18 U.S.C. also provides that any U.S. national or anyone found in the United
States who commits torture outside of the United States can be criminally prosecuted.
235. Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (2000). MEJA was enacted to “establish Federal
jurisdiction over offenses committed outside the United States by persons employed by or
accompanying the Armed Forces.” Id. at prologue.

407

2BOR-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/9/2005 2:24:45 PM

[2005

accountable for their injuries, they can potentially sue under either the
ATS or Bivens. Because the Supreme Court in Sosa would allow a suit
under the ATS for violations of clearly defined and widely accepted
violations of international law, torture and other abuse like that at Abu
Ghraib should fall within the ATS.236 Bivens is a harder question because
the Supreme Court has justified Bivens as both vindicating the
infringement of constitutional rights,237 and as deterring unconstitutional
conduct by government agents.238 While the deterrent rationale applies,
the vindication rationale does not. This Comment argues that the unique
circumstances at issue in the Abu Ghraib scandal should allow a Bivens
cause of action allowing the noncitizen victims to sue either the
individual soldiers or the private contractors who participated in the
abuse.
A. Remedies Against the United States in Its Sovereign Capacity
Of the potential defendants in any action arising from the abuses at
Abu Ghraib, the United States in its sovereign capacity is likely most
able to pay compensation. Normally, any claim against the United States
for a tort must be pleaded under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but the
Foreign Claims Act creates an administrative claims process for foreign
plaintiffs that is not subject to FTCA procedures or limitations.
The FCA provides the most direct route to relief for foreign
plaintiffs.239 Under the FCA, there is no need to travel to the United
States or deal with American legal procedure. Plaintiffs can go to local
claims commissions and potentially receive compensation from the U.S.
Government up to the full $100,000 allowed by statute.240 These factors
make the FCA an attractive option for the victims of Abu Ghraib. And
even though the FCA provides that injuries arising from the combat
activities of the military are not compensable,241 the definition of

236. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766–67.
237. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990) (implying that Bivens
should not be available to noncitizens with no connection to the United States).
238. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 485 (1994)); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
239. See 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2004).
240. See Report: Army Denies Most Compensation Claims by Iraqis, supra note 26.
241. FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 73:193 (update June 2004) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a)).
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noncombat activities242 is sufficiently broad that it should include the
operation of a prison that holds common criminals alongside detainees
suspected of “crimes against the coalition” and a “small number of
suspected ‘high-value’ leaders of the insurgency.”243 However, there is
evidence that many FCA claimants are denied any recovery at all or
given only minimal compensation.244
The other potential option for an action against the United States is
the FTCA. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain—that “the FTCA’s foreign country exception bars all claims
based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the
tortious act or omission occurred”245—conclusively bars the assertion of
liability against the United States in its sovereign capacity for torts
committed extraterritorially.246 Therefore, the FCA is really the only
option for recovering from the United States government.
B. United States Soldiers in Their Individual Capacity
Even though the United States is more able to pay compensation to
the victims than other potential defendants, if the victims choose not to
pursue claims under the FCA, their next option would be suing the
individuals who abused them. Suing the soldiers who participated in the
abuse directly and in their individual capacities provides a promising
avenue for the Abu Ghraib victims. Not only can the victims raise
colorable claims under both the ATS and Bivens, but because Islam
requires reparations for any physical injury, requiring their abusers to
take responsibility would likely offer the victims some measure of
personal satisfaction.247
242. Noncombat activities include any “activity, other than combat, war or armed conflict, that
is particularly military in character and has little parallel in the civilian community.” 32 C.F.R. §
842.41(c) (2004).
243. Hersch, supra note 1.
244. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
245. 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2754 (2004) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2004)).
246. Had the conduct occurred within the United States, the FTCA might have allowed for
liability against the United States based on the amendment allowing liability for intentional torts
committed by law enforcement personnel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2004). Because the reservists
were acting in a prison guard role, they were more like law enforcement officers than other soldiers.
Sosa’s language about the FTCA’s foreign country exception sweeps more broadly than this
amendment though. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754.
247. Personal satisfaction, closure, and related ideas are obviously culture-dependent
concepts. I suggest that the victims may gain some sense of satisfaction by recovering compensation
from their abusers only because of Iraq’s cultural preference for providing relief to the victims of
both intentional and unintentional wrongs. See AMIN, supra note 8, at 189.
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1. The ATS and TVPA
Torture should be remediable under the ATS because the
international consensus prohibiting it is clearly defined.248 In Sosa, the
unanimous Supreme Court concluded that the ATS created a right of
action for “the modest number of international law violations with a
potential for personal liability” at common law,249 and Justice Souter’s
majority opinion further concluded that “no development in the two
centuries from the enactment of [the ATS] to the birth of the modern line
of cases . . . has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing
a claim under the law of nations as an element of common law.”250
The majority’s standard for determining whether conduct would give
rise to liability under the ATS turns on whether it violates clearly defined
customary international and common law.251 Two of the primary
considerations the Court would look to in analyzing this question are
whether there are (1) treaties or (2) domestic legislative enactments
addressing the purported international norm.252 Torture satisfies both
considerations.
The United States has ratified the Covenant Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;253 the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which provides
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment”;254 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which contains the same prohibition against torture.255
248. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766–67. Torture would also be actionable under Justice Breyer’s
narrower view of the ATS as only allowing suits under those torts that are subjected to universal
criminal jurisdiction. See id. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 & cmt. a (1986)).
249. Id. at 2761. Again, these violations included “violation of safe conducts, infringement of
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. at 2756 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *68).
250. Id. at 2761. Those concurring with Justice Souter’s opinion were Justices Stevens,
O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 2764.
251. See id. at 2766–67.
252. Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
253. Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (ratified by the Senate on Oct. 21, 1994). The Senate
attached a Statement of Declaration, Reservation, and Understanding to its ratification, available at
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/documentation/reservations/cat.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter Understanding on the Convention Against Torture].
254. Dec. 16, 1996, arts. 7, 10, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by the Senate on June 8, 1992).
255. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. art.
5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Article 8 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy
by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
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Not only do these treaties potentially permit suits for torture under the
provision of the ATS allowing suit for a tort “committed in violation of .
. . a treaty of the United States,”256 but the Sosa majority cited treaties as
one of the most authoritative expressions of the law of nations.257
Moreover, in ratifying the Convention Against Torture, the Senate
attached an Understanding indicating that Congress interprets torture as
any act “intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering,”
threatening to inflict severe physical pain or suffering, or “other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality.”258 This definition would be useful for courts in evaluating
whether the abuse at Abu Ghraib amounted to legal torture.259
In addition to considering treaties, the Sosa majority allows
consideration of domestic statutes as evidence of customary international
law.260 The Torture Victim Protection Act, which was specifically
enacted as part of the ATS, provides a clear statement that the United
States considers itself bound to uphold the international consensus
against torture.261 Congress specifically enacted the TVPA to “carry out
the obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter and
other international agreements pertaining to the protection of human
rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of damages from an
individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.”262
Thus, the United States has both entered treaties prohibiting torture
and enacted domestic legislation providing “a civil action for recovery of
damages from an individual who engages in torture.”263 This should
satisfy a court that the customary international law norm prohibiting

constitution or by law.” Id. at art. 8. It is also worth mentioning that The Law of Administration for
the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, art. 15(J) (Mar. 8, 2004), prohibits torture and cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment.
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004). The Sosa opinion analyzed the law of nations provisions of the
ATS, not the treaty provisions. See Sosa, 124 U.S. at 2755–56, 2761–63.
257. Sosa, 124 U.S. at 2755–56, 2761–63.
258. Understanding on the Convention Against Torture, supra note 253, at II(1)(a).
259. This determination would have to be made on an individualized basis as to each plaintiff.
260. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
261. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
262. Id. § 1350 note, preamble (2004). The TVPA also defines torture in many of the same
terms as the Understanding on the Convention Against Torture. Compare id. § 3, with
Understanding on the Convention Against Torture, supra note 253.
263. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2.
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torture is sufficiently clearly defined in the United States so as to justify
creating a cause of action under the ATS.264
The Abu Ghraib detainees would need to argue that the ATS covers
torture, rather than simply suing directly under the TVPA, because of
some unfortunate wording in the TVPA. In providing a private right of
action against a torturer, the TVPA provides that “[a]n individual who,
under actual or apparent authority or color of law[] of any foreign
nation,” subjects someone to torture shall be liable in a civil action in the
United States.265 The “of any foreign nation” language could present a
problem because U.S. soldiers operate under U.S. law.266 While U.S.
military law prohibits torture, the statutory remedy for such a violation is
imposed by court martial and not a private right of action for the
victim.267 If a court were to apply the statute’s language strictly, it would
likely conclude that U.S. soldiers cannot be liable under the TVPA.
While this result is ironic, it could actually bolster potential
arguments by the Abu Ghraib victims that they should be able to sue
under the ATS. If Congress is willing to subject defendants with no
connection to the United States to liability for torture (despite the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law),268
subjecting American defendants to liability for torture should certainly
be permissible.
2. Bivens
As discussed above, whether Bivens should be available to remedy
extraterritorial torts is a more difficult question than whether the ATS
should provide a cause of action for torture. There are two distinct
concerns with the Bivens remedy that make this question difficult. First,
there are two different ways of justifying the creation of a Bivens
remedy, either as vindicating the deprivation of a constitutional right,269
264. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766. Even Justice Breyer’s narrower view—that creating a
private right of action under the ATS is justified only for those international law norms deemed so
important that states would subject them to universal criminal jurisdiction—would allow a cause of
action for torture. See id. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2 (emphasis added).
266. 10 U.S.C. §§ 802, 818 (2004) (providing that members of the military are subject to
federal military law). Not only are soldiers subject to the U.S. military command structure, but any
violations of military law are tried by a court martial. Id. § 818; see also Buchwalter, supra note 110.
267. See 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2004).
268. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); United States v. CurtissWright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
269. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990).
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or as deterring unconstitutional conduct by U.S. government agents.270
Second, courts avoid extending the scope of Bivens if there are “special
factors counseling hesitation.”271 However, neither of these concerns
should preclude the creation of a Bivens remedy for the abuse at Abu
Ghraib.
a. Vindication and deterrence. The Supreme Court has justified
Bivens as both a remedy for the violation of constitutional rights,272 and
as a deterrent of unlawful conduct by government actors.273 The
Supreme Court has also explicitly extended Bivens to violations of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause (and since that clause regulates
prisoner treatment, it is the most relevant constitutional provision to the
events at Abu Ghraib).274 Because the Abu Ghraib detainees are neither
American citizens nor within American territorial jurisdiction they
probably do not have a constitutional right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment.275 But because the soldiers are U.S. government
agents, the deterrence rationale of Bivens should apply against them.276
In this context, the tension between the different underlying
rationales for Bivens is clear. If the vindication rationale has priority, the
fact that the detainees are not U.S. citizens would be determinative,
regardless of the soldiers’ culpability. And if the deterrence rationale has
priority, victims without constitutional rights could recover against U.S.
government agents under a constitutional tort theory. In other words, the
270. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (citing FDIC v. Meyer,
510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994)); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
271. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
272. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274 (implying that Bivens should not be
available to noncitizens with no connection to the United States).
273. See, e.g., Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69.
274. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002); see also discussion supra notes 73,
101 & 212.
275. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265; Khalid v. Bush, Civil Case No. 1:04-1142
(RJL), Civil Case No. 1:04-1166 (RJL), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749, at *24 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005)
(“In the final analysis, the lynchpin for extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry to
aliens was and remains ‘the alien’s presence within [the United States’] territorial jurisdiction.’”
(quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950))). Even if they do not enjoy a
constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, they should enjoy this freedom as
a human right. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 255. The deprivation of
human rights, though, does not create Bivens liability.
276. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68 (“[T]he threat of suit against the United States [is]
insufficient to deter the unconstitutional acts of individuals.”); id. at 69 (“‘[T]he purpose of Bivens is
to deter the officer.’” (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994))).
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two rationales appear to be mutually exclusive in this situation. If the
victims are allowed to recover under Bivens despite not being citizens,
then the vindication rationale, and Justice Rehnquist’s discussion of the
Constitution-as-social-contract in Verdugo-Urquidez,277 would be
vitiated. And if soldiers are able to abuse people with impunity, simply
because their victims are not U.S. citizens or aliens within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States,278 the deterrence rationale would be
reduced to an inquiry about who the victim is, rather than about what the
officer did and whether that action was constitutionally appropriate.
Neither of these alternatives is completely satisfactory. Still, there
are three reasons that Bivens relief should be available to the Abu Ghraib
victims. First, Justice Souter’s opinion for the majority in Sosa presumes
that Bivens is available to remedy extraterritorial constitutional torts.279
In concluding that the ATS should not provide a cause of action for
arbitrary detention, Justice Souter stated that allowing a claim under the
ATS would “supplant[] the actions under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Bivens . . . that now provide damages remedies” for unconstitutional
seizures of aliens.280 This statement indicates that a majority of the Court
believes that in certain circumstances Bivens is available to aliens injured
abroad.281 Saying that Bivens should be unavailable to the Abu Ghraib
victims simply because they are aliens would be inconsistent with the
majority opinion in Sosa.282

277. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265, 274 (holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects “[t]he right of the people,” which “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community”).
278. See id. at 265; see also supra note 195 and accompanying text.
279. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768.
280. Id. (emphasis added); see supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text.
281. The Sosa majority’s statement is perhaps inconsistent with the dicta in Verdugo-Urquidez
that expressed discomfort at the possibility of Bivens being available to “aliens with no attachment to
this country” for extraterritorial violations of the Fourth Amendment’s Search Clause. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. at 274. The references to Bivens in both opinions are dicta: the statement in Sosa
is dictum because it was not essential to the conclusion that the ATS was unavailable to remedy
arbitrary detention, Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768; the statement in Verdugo-Urquidez is dictum because
that case was a criminal case that (obviously) did not involve any questions of civil liability,
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261. However, there need not be a war of dicta because the VerdugoUrquidez Court limited its concerns to the facts of the case—“[u]nder these circumstances, the
Fourth Amendment has no application.” Id. at 275. Furthermore, the Verdugo-Urquidez Court did
not rule out the availability of Bivens relief. Id. at 274. Rather, it expressed concern about the
chilling effect extending Bivens to extraterritorial searches would have on law enforcement. Id.
282. I say “simply” because it is reasonable to assume that the conduct at Abu Ghraib would
create Bivens liability if committed in the United States. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734–35,
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Second, any suits by the Abu Ghraib prisoners would arise under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which broadly regulates
government treatment of prisoners.283 Because the Eighth Amendment
does not include the same textual limitation on its protection as the
Fourth Amendment, the Court’s conclusion in Verdugo-Urquidez about
the Fourth Amendment and “the people”284 should not govern questions
involving the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. And because the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause broadly regulates the conduct of
government officers, it is “in respect of our own citizens” and should not
be barred by the presumption of territorial limitation on domestic law in
Curtiss-Wright.285 Furthermore, because the prisoners at Abu Ghraib
were under American authority and control at the time, it would not be
unreasonable to require government officers to treat them in a manner
similar to that which applies to prisoners (including aliens) held
domestically.286 Rather, this would apply the Eighth Amendment equally
to government agents regardless of where they act.
Third, the conduct at issue in the Abu Ghraib scandal would very
likely give rise to Bivens liability if committed against a U.S. citizen or
alien held in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.287 In Hope v.
Pelzer, the Supreme Court held that hitching a prisoner to a post for an
extended time without bathroom breaks was unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual punishment because there was no valid penological or safety
interest in restraining him that way.288 While there are obviously factual
differences between Hope, other cruel and unusual punishment cases,
and Abu Ghraib, the Abu Ghraib victims could certainly assert that there
was no legitimate penological interest in stripping them, in forcing them
into humiliating positions, or in the other types of abuse.289 If the conduct
739 (2002).
283. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; supra Part IV.B.
284. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274–75.
285. 299 U.S. at 318; see also supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
286. See Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, Note, The Unavoidable Correlative: Extraterritorial
Power and the United States Constitution, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 147, 197 (“If the United
States exercises sovereign authority over the individual, each provision of the Constitution should
apply.”).
287. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274 (allowing Bivens to aliens with some “attachment
to this country”); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 163 (2d Cir. 2002). In Yousef the Second
Circuit treated an Eighth Amendment claim brought by an alien but held in a federal prison on the
merits, implying that the Eighth Amendment applies to aliens held within the United States. See also
supra note 195.
288. 536 U.S. at 738.
289. Otherwise, the soldiers would not have been convicted at court martial. See supra notes
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would create constitutional liability if done against either a U.S. citizen
or an alien held in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, it
should be appropriate to allow the same liability for conduct taken
against aliens in the physical and legal custody of United States officers.
Finally, where allowing a cause of action based on just one of the
Bivens rationales would allow the victims of unconstitutional conduct by
U.S. agents to assert a claim (subject to qualified immunity and other
defenses),290 but requiring the other rationale would preclude that claim
entirely, a court should be able to allow legitimately aggrieved plaintiffs
a day in court to present their case.291 Obviously, fairness is not
determinative, but when, as here, there is a conflict between two of the
stated rationales for a judicial doctrine, courts should be allowed to
consider it.
Therefore, even though Bivens’s vindication rationale does not apply
because the victims are noncitizens, the particular circumstances in the
Abu Ghraib scandal should allow extending Bivens on the basis of the
deterrence rationale. Not only would this be consistent with the Sosa
majority’s apparent understanding of Bivens, it would ensure that federal
officers are governed by the same constitutional standards on the
treatment of prisoners regardless of where they operate. It would allow
the victims of abuse by U.S. soldiers a chance to seek compensation from
their abusers.
b. Special factors counseling hesitation against extending Bivens:
the political question doctrine and the military. Assuming that an
extraterritorial violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
would support a cause of action under Bivens, we still need to consider
whether the political question doctrine and the deference that courts
typically show the military should act as a “special factor[] counseling
hesitation” in the creation of a Bivens remedy for the Abu Ghraib
victims.292 Because Bivens is a judicially created remedy, the Court has
4–6.
290. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. But for the Coalition Provisional
Authority Order immunizing the soldiers, the Abu Ghraib victims would very likely have had a
cause of action under Iraqi law against their abusers. See CIVIL CODE art. 202 (1951) (Iraq);
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2; supra notes 8 & 13.
291. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67–68 (characterizing the extension of Bivens to those
situations where no other effective remedy was available). Furthermore, because all incidents of
torture throughout the world would not involve a U.S. government agent defendant, allowing a cause
of action here would not extend Bivens to a limitless class of plaintiffs.
292. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
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expressed hesitance in extending it when “Congress has provided an
alternative remedy which it explicitly declare[s] to be a substitute for
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective,”293 or when there are “special factors counseling hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”294
In an opinion by then-Judge Scalia in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, a
case brought against high-level executive officials challenging the
Reagan administration’s role in the Nicaraguan Contra situation,295 the
D.C. Circuit concluded that “the special needs of foreign affairs must
stay our hand in the creation of damage remedies against military and
foreign policy officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign
subjects causing injury abroad.”296 This is a somewhat specialized
phrasing of the political question doctrine, under which courts defer to
the political branches in addressing problems better resolved by those
branches.297 Because the legislative298 and executive299 branches have
control of the military, regulating the conduct of soldiers is a prototypical
situation calling for application of the political question doctrine.300

293. Id. at 18–19.
294. Bivens, 446 U.S. at 396.
295. 770 F.2d 202, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
296. Id. at 209. Specifically, the plaintiffs in Sanchez-Espinoza sought Bivens relief for alleged
violations of the Fourth Amendment by guerilla forces allegedly trained by United States citizens.
See id. at 205. Under the later Supreme Court decisions in Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273–75
(refusing to allow Bivens liability for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment committed
abroad), and in Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 (refusing to apply Bivens liability under a respondeat
superior theory), the suit in Sanchez-Espinoza would have clearly not been viable.
297. See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 242 F. Supp. 2d 686, 689–90 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citing
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)); Benjamin Schmidt, Comment, Compensating War Victims
in Iraq and Afghanistan, 1 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y (Aug. 2004), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/groups/jilp/Ben.pdf.
298. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1 (“provide for the common [defense]”); id. at cl. 13 (“[t]o
provide and maintain a Navy”); id. at cl. 14 (“[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the Land and Naval forces”); id. at cl. 15 (“[t]o provide for calling forth of the Militia”); id. at cl. 16
(“[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of
them as may be employed in the service of the United States”).
299. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States . . . .”).
300. It is in large part due to the deference traditionally shown the military that courts have
recognized the so-called Feres doctrine, which generally provides that soldiers cannot use the FTCA
to sue the United States for injuries arising from activities incident to military service. See Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 625. The Feres
doctrine has often been justified on the ground that courts should stay out of internal military
governance. See id. at 627–28.
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However, would the creation of a judicial remedy interfere with the
“special needs of foreign affairs” or with the political branches’ control
of the military? Not in the context of Abu Ghraib. First, the decision in
Sanchez-Espinoza focused on the political character of the lawsuit and
the policymaking role of the defendants.
Whether or not the present litigation is motivated by considerations of
geopolitics rather than personal harm, we think that as a general matter
the danger of foreign citizens’ using the courts in situations such as this
to obstruct the foreign policy of our government is sufficiently acute
that we must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy
should exist.301

The soldiers implicated in the Abu Ghraib scandal are not
policymakers, and the courts do not need to protect them to protect the
formation and execution of foreign or military policy in the same way
that was necessary in Sanchez-Espinoza. This is because, unlike
Sanchez-Espinoza, any suits by the Abu Ghraib victims would challenge
individual conduct, rather than the entire official government policy
putting the soldiers in the country.302
Second, any relief against the soldiers would not “obstruct the
foreign policy of our government” because the United States has
condemned the abuse at Abu Ghraib.303 While condemnation does not
mean the courts should automatically create a judicial remedy for the
victims of the condemned conduct, the President, Congress, and the
military’s courts martial have stated that what happened at Abu Ghraib
was inappropriate.304 That the Executive and Legislative branches have
refused to defend what happened indicates that allowing a judicial
remedy would not obstruct a government policy.
Third, providing a judicial remedy would not interfere with internal
military governance because the military has already investigated,

301. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 209 (emphasis added).
302. Id. at 204 (describing the suit as a general challenge to Executive support for the
Nicaraguan Contras).
303. Id.; see Global Message (May 6, 2004), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2004/05/20040506-1.html (statement by President Bush calling the abuse at Abu
Ghraib “abhorrent”).
304. See Eric Schmitt & Douglas Jehl, Army Says C.I.A. Hid More Iraqis than It Claimed,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at A6 (“‘We had a gigantic failure of leadership—one that a year ago, I
would have said was impossible to have in the United States Army.’” (quoting Representative John
Kline, Republican of Minnesota)); Global Message, supra note 303; supra notes 4–6 (discussing
court martial proceedings).
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reprimanded, and sentenced many of the participants.305 And fourth,
creating a judicial remedy for past conduct against specified tortfeasors
would not frustrate whatever efforts the military or Congress may
undertake to prevent future abuses.306
In summary, because the Abu Ghraib victims cannot sue their
abusers under Iraqi law,307 they must use U.S. law. Under U.S. law, the
two primary theories under which they could sue U.S. military personnel
in their individual capacities are the ATS and Bivens. Courts should have
no trouble in creating a cause of action for torture under the ATS because
the Sosa majority adopted a flexible standard that would allow clearly
defined violations of customary international law to be actionable in U.S.
courts.308 Based on various treaties and domestic statutes addressing and
even defining torture, courts should find that the international norm
against torture is sufficiently clearly defined to allow liability under the
ATS.
Whether there should be a Bivens cause of action is a more difficult
question. This Comment has argued that Bivens should be available
against the soldiers who participated in the abuse at Abu Ghraib because
one of the principal purposes of the Bivens remedy is to deter federal
agents from acting unconstitutionally,309 and because foreign and
military policy would not be frustrated by the imposition of civil liability
against the soldiers.310

305. See supra notes 4–6.
306. If anything, the imposition of civil liability against the abusers would likely augment
whatever deterrents the military would otherwise impose by showing other soldiers that they could
be responsible for damages to the people they may abuse. One Law Review editor suggested that
exposing soldiers to personal liability would make military recruiting more difficult. While I
understand the concern, § 1983 and Bivens liability have not proven insurmountable obstacles to the
recruitment of police officers, FBI agents, or prison guards. Furthermore, I sincerely doubt that
military recruits join the army so they will be able to abuse people.
307. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2.
308. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766–67 (2004).
309. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 392 (1971); see also, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001); United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
310. One practical consideration to be addressed if a court recognizes a cause of action under
Bivens is the statute of limitations. Because Bivens is an implied remedy it includes no limitations
period, and courts usually borrow the state statute of limitations for personal injury. See Indus.
Constructors Corp. v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 1994). Iraq
has a three-year statute of limitation for tort actions. CIVIL CODE art. 232 (1951) (Iraq). A three year
statute of limitations is not unreasonable.
The Iraqi Civil Code, as amended, is still in force. The Law of Administration for the State of
Iraq for the Transitional Period, the document governing the Coalition Provisional Government,
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Moreover, allowing civil relief under the ATS or Bivens would not
open the floodgates to litigation. First, as federal officers, soldiers would
be able to assert the defense of qualified immunity.311 Because qualified
immunity “shield[s] [a government defendant] from liability for [civil
damages] if their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known,’”312 innocent soldiers would be protected. While it is tempting to
suggest that the soldiers must have known that what they were doing was
wrong, this is an outsider’s perspective. In any civil suit, the soldiers
would be able to explain the unique circumstances at Abu Ghraib, and
qualified immunity may be appropriate. Second, given the fact that the
United States really is at war, it would be appropriate for a court to
refuse to hear suits for conduct that would not be compensable under the
FCA’s combat activities exclusion.313 In the FCA, Congress permitted
liability to be asserted against the United States for the military’s
noncombat activities, and where those noncombat activities have clear
analogues in the civilian prison system, subjecting military personnel to
the same standards and the same liability as their domestic counterparts
provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Law, the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004
shall remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Transitional Government in
accordance with this Law.” The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional
Period, art. 26 (Mar. 8, 2004); E-mail from M. Lawrence, Iraqi International Law Group, to Scott J.
Borrowman (Dec. 11, 2004, 03:53 MST) (on file with author).
Another practical consideration for any suit under either Bivens or the ATS would be where
the victim could sue. Because the violations occurred in Iraq—even though in a prison wholly
controlled by the United States—venue would lie in the defendant’s home district under 28 U.S.C. §
1391 (2004). Because the soldiers are “officer[s] or employee[s] of the United States or an[] agency
thereof acting . . . under color of legal authority” (that is, because they work for the Department of
Defense), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) applies. This section allows suit in any district where a defendant
resides, or even where the plaintiff resides “if no real property is involved in the action.” Id. As to
the civilian contractors, § 1391(b) applies. This section provides that venue is proper
in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same
state, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred . . . , or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be
found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
Id. While most of the soldiers involved in the Abu Ghraib scandal were in the 327th Military Police
Brigade Company, which is based in Maryland, see Richard A. Serrano, Soldier ‘Bewildered’ over
Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2004, at A14, the individual soldiers may be residents of other states.
Also, the civilian contractors could be from anywhere.
311. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 539–40 (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168–69
(1992)); supra Part II.B.2.b.2.
312. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)). The language referring to statutory or constitutional rights may support the vindication
rationale.
313. See 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2004).
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should not unnecessarily infringe on the United States’ ability to
prosecute the war.
C. Individual Private Contractors
At his sentencing hearing, Specialist Graner testified that “his orders
came from civilian contractors as well as military intelligence.”314 The
Taguba Report also indicates that civilian contractors were responsible
for some of the abuse.315 Because private contractors enjoy immunity
under Iraqi law similar to that enjoyed by soldiers, any suits against the
contractors would also need to arise under U.S. law.
Because Sosa is concerned with whether a norm of customary
international law is sufficiently clearly defined as to justify the creation
of a common law cause of action, rather than the identify of the
defendant, the analysis of the ATS against soldiers applies equally
against private contractors.316 Therefore, because the international
consensus condemning torture is clearly established by both domestic
and international materials, a court should allow suit under the ATS
against civilian contractors who participated in the abuse at Abu Ghraib.
The one wrinkle in determining whether Bivens should be available
against private contractors is the Supreme Court’s Malesko decision,317
which many commentators see as precluding Bivens actions against
private actors.318 However, the core holding of Malesko forbids a Bivens
remedy based solely on respondeat superior liability.319 The decision
does not necessarily preclude the assertion of liability under Bivens
against private individuals acting under federal authority. In Malesko, the
Court concluded that “if a corporate defendant is available for suit,
claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual
directly responsible for the alleged injury.”320 Suing an employer for the
conduct of an employee would frustrate the deterrence rationale of

314. Candiotti & Polk, supra note 6.
315. See Taguba Report, supra note 2, at 2.
316. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766–67 (2004).
317. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001).
318. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, More or Less Bunk: The Establishment Clause Answers That
History Doesn’t Provide, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1617, 1626 n.36; Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare:
How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform,
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 639 n.224 (2004).
319. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71–73.
320. Id. at 71 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 (1993)
(plurality)).
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Bivens because it would not deter individual violations of the
Constitution.321 But holding the individual employees—the very people
capable of violating the Constitution and therefore being deterred by
Bivens—liable would not frustrate the deterrence rationale.322 It was on
this analysis that the majority held, “[w]ith respect to the alleged
constitutional deprivation, [the plaintiff’s] only remedy lies against the
individual” who injured him (even if he is a private contractor).323
Therefore, the apparent hurdle in Malesko should not prevent
asserting a cause of action under Bivens against the private contractors
who participated in the abuse at Abu Ghraib. Because, in contrast to
federal officers, civilian contractors would not enjoy qualified immunity,
suing the civilian contractors is a potentially attractive option.324
Thus, the FCA provides the most efficient method of obtaining
compensation for the injuries the Abu Ghraib detainees received.
Because the FTCA’s foreign country exception would bar suit against the
United States, if any of the detainees wanted to sue for compensation,
they would need to sue the soldiers and civilian contractors in their
individual capacities. Such suits should be permitted under the ATS
because the international consensus against torture is clearly defined by
both international treaties and other documents, and by domestic
statutes.325 The question on Bivens liability is somewhat trickier because
321. Id. at 69–70.
322. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to rule on the Bivens action
against the employee who refused to let the inmate use the elevator because that claim had been
dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. See id. at 65.
323. Id. at 72; see CHEMERINKSY, supra note 42, at 610 n.122.
324. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 539–40 (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168–
69 (1992)). Malesko would bar the assertion of liability against a private contractor’s employer on a
respondeat superior theory. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71–73. Because these corporations share their
employees’ immunity to suit under Iraqi law, see Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17
(revised), supra note 13, § 4(2), obtaining relief from these corporations requires a little more
creativity. In a class action suit filed against the Titan Corporation—the employer of one of the
civilian contractors identified in the Taguba Report—the plaintiffs allege causes of action arising
under RICO, the ATS, the Constitution, and the Geneva Convention. See Complaint, Al-Rawi v.
Titan (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2004) (No. 04 CV 1143 R), at http://www.cdi.org/news/law/Al-Rawi-vTitan-Complaint.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). It also raises a number of common law theories,
including negligent hiring, failure to train, and unjust enrichment, that have their locus in America
and should therefore be exempt from the immunity to Iraqi law. See id.; Saleh v. Titan Corp., 353
F.Supp.2d 1087 (S.D. Cal. 2004). The most recent action on this case was an order transferring it to
the Eastern District of Virginia. Saleh v. Titan Corp., No. 04 CV 1143 R(NLS), 2005 WL 668830
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2005). A similar purported class action has also been filed in the District Court
for the District of Columbia. See Complaint, Ibrahim v. Titan Corp. (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2005) (No. 0401248). It also asserts causes of action under the ATS, RICO, and common law tort theories. Id.
325. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766–67.
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allowing liability would advance the deterrence rationale of the Bivens
doctrine, but not the vindication rationale. I have argued that because the
Sosa majority assumes Bivens is available to remedy extraterritorial torts,
because the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is a broad limitation
on government conduct, and because the conduct at Abu Ghraib would
likely give rise to Bivens liability if it had occurred in the United States,
courts should be able to allow Bivens liability. I have also argued that the
fact that the defendants would be military personnel should not constitute
a special factor counseling hesitation against the creation of a Bivens
remedy against either the soldiers or the private contractors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States should provide civil relief to the victims of the
Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. Doing so would promote the United
States’ image among the Iraqi people and in the Middle East at large, and
would therefore aid both our efforts in Iraq and in the prosecution of the
larger war on terror. It would also reflect compliance with our obligation
under the Convention Against Torture to “ensure in [our] legal system
that the victim of an act of torture [can] obtain redress and has an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means
for as full rehabilitation as possible.”326
The most efficient way of providing these victims compensation is
through the Foreign Claims Act.327 Under the FCA, victims could go to a
military claims commission in Iraq and, hopefully with no more than the
now infamous pictures, obtain a settlement. But many Iraqis see both the
FCA and court martial proceedings against the offenders as

326. Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1984, art. 14, 23 I.L.M. 1027. The Senate’s statement on the ratification of the
Convention indicated that this provision would not be self-executing. See Understanding on the
Convention Against Torture, supra note 253, at III(1). In other words, Congress stated that the
Convention would not create a cause of action without further action by Congress. See id. at II(5).
The TVPA was supposed to be this further action. On the one hand, the TVPA went further than the
Understanding indicated that Congress would go—it created a cause of action for the victims of
torture whenever the defendant operated under color of foreign law and regardless of where the
torture was committed. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. On the other hand, the TVPA was also apparently
based on the (unfortunately erroneous) conclusion that someone acting under U.S. law would not
torture. See supra notes 4–10, 265–68 and accompanying text. In any event, by ratifying the
Convention, the United States has acknowledged its obligation to provide legal remedies for the
victims of torture.
327. See 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2004).
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inadequate.328 If the FCA does not provide sufficient compensation, or if
the victims are interested in suing those who abused them, they must
assert violations of United States law to avoid the immunity provided
under Coalition Provisional Authority’s Orders.329 This Comment has
suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
should allow a cause of action under the ATS because there is broad,
clear international consensus that torture and abuse of prisoners is
unlawful. It has also suggested that the statement in Sosa that Bivens
“now provide[s] damages remedies” for extraterritorial constitutional
torts330 indicates that the Supreme Court would consider liability on a
constitutional tort theory like Bivens.
Whatever the avenue, providing a remedy to those abused by U.S.
military personnel and civilian contractors is the right thing to do.
Convicting the soldiers involved has shown the Iraqi people that our own
soldiers are not above the law. Providing civil relief to the victims would
show the Iraqi people that the law serves everyone, even the politically
unimportant. Hopefully, that would provide the same sort of enthusiasm
for democracy and the rule of law that the recent elections have.331
Scott J. Borrowman∗

328. See Todd Richissin & Gail Gibson, Iraqis See U.S. Sham as Abuse Trials Open,
BALTIMORE SUN, June 21, 2004, at 1A; Report: Army Denies Most Compensation Claims by Iraqis,
supra note 26 (“‘Our point of view toward the Americans has changed. You can feel the fury inside
you,’ said Amir Shleman, who lost a brother who was a father of a 7-year-old boy and 13-year-old
girl. ‘If they treated people like human beings, no one would take up weapons against them.’”).
329. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), supra note 13, § 2.
330. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768–69.
331. See, e.g., Robert J. Caldwell, Iraq's Triumph; Democracy Trumped Terrorism, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 6, 2005, at G1; Remarks by President Bush, President Congratulates
Iraqis
on
Election
(Jan.
30,
2005),
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/01/20050130-2.html.
∗ I would like to thank Professor Marguerite Driessen, Breanne Devey, Brinton Wilkins,
Ryan Morris, and the Law Review editors for their help and insight. I would also like to thank
Professors Kif Augustine-Adams and Douglas Floyd for supporting my interest in international law
and federal jurisdiction. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Hilary for her support during the
writing of this Comment. Any remaining errors are mine alone.
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